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1 Introduction
Firms use their real estate as collateral, so rising house prices increase collateral values
and relax firms’ financial constraints. Corporate finance typically views better access
to credit as positive. In early theoretical work, increases in collateral value and credit
lead to economic expansion and higher efficiency (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997). Recent work shows that real estate booms increase firms’ leverage
(Cvijanovic, 2014) and investment (Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). Other studies,
however, cast doubt on the predicted positive effects of higher asset values.1 During the
recent credit boom, fueled by rising real estate prices, total factor productivity (TFP)
growth became less cyclical (Wang, 2014; Fernald and Wang, 2016). The contribution of
factor reallocation across firms to productivity growth also declined (Decker, Haltiwanger,
Jarmin and Miranda, 2016, 2017). So far, we lack empirical evidence that connects
changes in firm collateral with aggregate productivity.
This paper shows that rising real estate prices reduce industry productivity, because
they lead to a reallocation of capital and labor towards inefficient firms. I construct
real estate holdings for a large sample of listed US firms from 1993 to 2008 and show
that an increase in real estate value relaxes collateral constraints. Higher collateral value
significantly increases firms’ debt, investment, and employment. However, I find that
real estate holding firms have persistently lower levels of TFP and labor productivity
than non-holders. Both facts combined imply that inefficient firms expanded relative to
more productive firms. Aggregating to the four-digit industry level, results show that
reallocation leads to a significant decline in industry productivity. A 10 % increase in the
growth of real estate value reduces TFP growth by 0.62 %. The effect is economically
meaningful. Over the sample period, real estate prices grew around 4 % per year and
productivity growth averaged 1.75 % annually (Cardarelli and Lusinyan, 2015).
Poor allocation of resources across firms explains results: the covariance between firm
size and productivity declines as prices rise. The decline implies that unproductive firms
grow faster than productive firms. There is no effect on unconditional mean industry
productivity, so the rise in real estate values does not reduce productivity of the average
firm. I also find that capital and labor allocation is worse in industries with a high initial
dispersion of real estate holdings across firms. For misallocation to play a role, firms’
constraints must be relaxed asymmetrically. If each firm has a similar share of real estate
out of total assets, there is no dispersion across firms. Rising real estate prices would
allow all firms to borrow more to the same extent, there would be no change in firms’
1See Schularick and Taylor (2012); Gorton and Ordonez (2016); Borio, Kharroubi, Upper and Zam-
polli (2016); Richter, Schularick and Wachtel (2017)
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relative size, and thus no reallocation. For industries with high dispersion of real estate
values I find a significant decline in TFP growth when prices increase (−1,12 % for a
10 % increase), while industries with low dispersion see only a weak and insignificant
decline. Results extend to industries covered in the NBER manufacturing database. For
the manufacturing sector, rising real estate prices reduce productivity growth, and also
lead to faster growth in employment of low-skilled workers, compared to high skilled
workers.
In a final step, I shed light on the role of the financial sector. I show that better
informed banks contributed less to the credit boom fueled by rising real estate prices.
Banks with superior knowledge about borrower quality rely less on collateral when de-
ciding over new loans. Thus, the sensitivity of firm debt to rising collateral values is
lower for firms that borrow from well-informed banks. Specifically, I use syndicated loan
market data to construct banks’ industry specialization (defined as banks’ loan share to
an industry).2 I show that borrowers in banks’ main industries receive significantly fewer
loans in response to an increase in real estate value. Moreover, specialized banks are
better able to funnel funds towards high-productivity firms when collateral values rise.
Banks with no specialization are not able to discriminate between high and low-quality
borrowers. The importance of banks’ borrower knowledge suggests that the rapid geo-
graphic expansion of banks into new markets could have fueled the real estate boom and
with it a poor allocation of resources.
My findings highlight that the cross-sectional variation in firms’ assets, as well as
their joint distribution with productivity, matter for aggregate variables. Relative to
the existing literature I make two main contributions. I highlight the importance of
collateral constraints for the allocation of capital and labor across firms. Thereby, I open
up the ‘black box’ of abstract wedges driving misallocation. My results provide direct
evidence that firm-specific distortions, collateral constraints in terms of real estate, lead
to reallocation of resources across firms and reduce aggregate productivity. I also offer
a unified interpretation of how misallocation reduces cyclicality of productivity and why
housing booms are associated with ‘bad booms’ (Gorton and Ordonez, 2016; Richter,
Schularick and Wachtel, 2017). During the 20 years leading up to the financial crisis,
rising real estate values relaxed collateral constraints, which shifted resources towards
unproductive firms. This, in turn, dampened productivity growth in a period of economic
expansion, leading to acyclical TFP and a decline in efficiency. Speaking to literature that
highlights the supply side of poor allocation of credit across sectors (see Borio, Kharroubi,
2For literature on the importance of banks’ specialization on expertise knowledge, screening, and
monitoring, see Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2006); Loutskina and Strahan (2011); Giannetti and
Saidi (2017). Ongena and Smith (2001) and Berger and Udell (2002) provide evidence on the role of
bank-firm connections in determining loan terms.
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Upper and Zampolli (2016); Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018)), I focus on
demand-driven reallocation due to changes in collateral values.
I build on seminal work by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow
(2009). They sparked an active literature that shows that misallocation of resources ex-
plains a large part of differences in productivity and welfare across countries.3 At the
heart of the models are wedges that distort an efficient allocation of labor and capital.
Buera and Shin (2013) highlight the importance of financing constraints in misallocat-
ing resources and distorting the marginal product of capital. Moll (2014) shows that
financial frictions reduce productivity growth and slow down the transition to the steady
state. Midrigan and Xu (2014) find financial frictions distort entry and technology adop-
tion decisions, generate dispersion in the returns to capital across existing producers,
and thus productivity losses from misallocation. The above papers find that relaxing
financial constraints for productive firms improves welfare. Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan,
Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez (2017) find that, after the introduction of the Euro,
capital was allocated towards unproductive firms that saw their constraints relaxed be-
cause they benefited from low interest rates. They assume constrained firms to be large
firms, which were able to reap the benefits of lower borrowing costs. Overall, literature
established that financial constraints matter for misallocation. Yet, there still exists little
direct evidence about the origin of constraints and how they interact with the aggregate
economy.
I also add to studies analyzing the effects of credit growth on aggregate productivity.
Recent work on bubbles emphasizes the importance of fluctuations of collateral value
in reallocating resources across agents, but usually assumes an exogenous path of pro-
ductivity (Martin and Ventura, 2012; Miao and Wang, 2012). Several empirical papers
discuss the effect of credit booms using macroeconomic data (Barajas, Dell’Ariccia and
Levchenko, 2007; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). Gorton and Ordonez (2016) show that
credit booms lead to sharp increases in output and investment, but often fail to generate
improvements in TFP. Schularick and Taylor (2012) look at a large sample of countries
from 1870 to 2008 and find that many credit booms lead to financial crises. Aizenman,
Jinjarak and Zheng (2016) show that declines in house prices can lead to an increase in
productivity. My results are related to recent papers by Borio, Kharroubi, Upper and
Zampolli (2016) and Shi (2017), which focus on reallocation of labor and entrepreneurial
talent across sectors during credit booms.
A large literature links real estate prices to firm decisions. Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2006, 2009) look at the effect of real estate on debt capacity and capital reallocation.
3Numerous policy papers use their methodology to gauge the potential welfare gains from better
allocation of resources. See, for example, Page´s (2010).
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Gan (2007) and Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) look at the consequences of an increase
in real estate prices on firm investment. They find that increases in real estate value lead
to significantly higher investment by firms that hold higher amounts of real estate as
assets. Cvijanovic (2014) and Yesiltas (2016) find US firms increased their leverage and
changed their capital structure in response to an increase in collateral value. Campello
and Larrain (2016) show firms in Eastern European countries increased their share of
fixed assets and employment when a regulatory change allowed them to pledge a larger
fraction of their real estate assets as collateral. Cerqueiro, Ongena and Roszbach (2017)
find that a reduction in pledgeable collateral negatively affects firm performance. In a
recent paper, Catherine, Chaney, Huang, Sraer and Thesmar (2018) estimate a structural
model to quantify the aggregate effects of looser collateral constraints. They find that
reallocation explains around 25 % of total welfare gains, but do not take into account a
negative correlation between firms’ real estate and productivity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains data and variable definitions, Sec-
tion 3 empirical strategy and identification. Section 4 shows main results on the firm and
industry level and provides evidence on poor allocation of resources. Section 5 reports
robustness checks and extensions, and section 6 sheds light on the role of the financial
sector. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
I use data on listed companies in the US from 1993 to 2008. Detailed firm level data allows
me to address concerns of endogeneity and reverse causality. Thereby I can identify the
underlying channel through which changes on the firm level affect the aggregate economy.
This section describes data and variable construction.
2.1 Variable Definitions
Firm information is provided by Standard & Poor’s Compustat Database (CS). I restrict
the analysis to firms with headquarters in the United States and exclude all firms in
finance, insurance, real estate, and mining industries, as well as non-operating establish-
ments. All firms must appear for at least three consecutive years and show no gaps. For
detailed variable definitions, see section B in the appendix.
Firm Characteristics Main dependent variables are long-term debt, investment, em-
ployment, and value added. All dependent variables are standardized by lagged fixed
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assets (defined as lagged book value of property, plant and equipment), as is standard
in the corporate finance literature.4 I estimate firm f ’s productivity a on the two digit
industry level i for production function yft = aftk
αi
ft l
1−αi
ft with year fixed effects, where
y is valued added, k is fixed assets, and l is employment. I estimate capital and labor
coefficients on the two-digit level to have a sufficient number of observations for each
industry. All variables are deflated with the appropriate industry price indices. For ro-
bustness checks, I also use estimation methods developed in Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and explicitly include structures as a factor of production.
Firm controls include firm size, defined as log of total assets; market-to-book ratio,
defined as the sum of total assets and common shares minus common equity and deferred
taxes, standardized by total assets; return on assets, defined as operating income minus
depreciation over total assets; and sales growth to proxy for investment opportunities.
To measure firm age, I merge my data with CRSP, which reports each company’s initial
public offering (IPO) date. As IPOs mark an important change in the life of a company,
literature uses IPO dates as a standard proxy for firm age. Additionally, I define five
different metrics for financial constraints (see Section B).
Real Estate Data I define structures as buildings and construction in progress, and
land as land and improvements. To maximize the sample size, for each firm I take the
average across each variable from 1993-1995, when the number of firms reporting real
estate increases rapidly. I drop all observations with negative or missing values.5 I inflate
firms’ initial 1993-1995 values with state-level real estate price indices. For structures
I use the price index for residential housing and for land the price index for residential
land (Davis and Heathcote, 2007). To match state and MSA price indices with data
in Compustat, I match firms’ ZIP and FIPS codes, which can then be merged with
the respective state and MSA codes. The main independent variable real estate value is
defined as the inflated series for structures plus land, standardized by lagged fixed assets.6
Two main assumptions underlie the construction of real estate value. When inflating
real estate value by state-level house and land prices, I assume that firms’ real estate is
located in the same state as their headquarters. Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) and
Cvijanovic (2014) confirm with help of firms’ 10K files that this is true for a sizeable
part of firms in the sample. I also verify that results are robust to using land values
4See Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012); Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018).
5For all baseline results, I only include firms already active in 1993. The online appendix shows that
including firms entering after 1993 does not alter results.
6Land prices increased significantly stronger than house price in the run-up to the crisis. In contrast
to Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) I thus inflate structures and land with separate indices.
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as dependent variable.7 Additionally, I assume that residential real estate prices reflect
commercial real estate prices in the same geographical area. Previous research shows
the correlation between both series is high and regression results comparable (Gyourko,
2009). Disaggregated commercial real estate prices are confidential and not available to
the researcher. For robustness tests, I use commercial real estate price indices for four
census regions from 1996 onward, provided by CoStarGroup’s Complete CCRSI data set.
I winsorize all dependent variables and real estate at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Industry Level Industry variables are averages across firms weighted by value added.
Growth rates are log differences of averages and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile
in each year to avoid that outliers drive results. As controls I compute industry sales
growth, industry capital-labor ratios, as well as average return on assets and log firm
size. The latter control for the fact that some industries are dominated by a few large
firms with high return on assets. For every industry I additionally define the following
metrics.
Initial dispersion: For reallocation to play role, firms must differ in their real estate as
share of total assets. If a rising tide lifts all boats equally, there is no relative shift in firm
size and hence no reallocation. Rising real estate values must relax financial constraints
asymmetrically within each industry, which requires variation across firms in terms of real
estate assets. I define industries initial dispersion in real estate value as the standard
deviation of average 1993-1995 real estate value across all firms within each industry. I
split industries into bottom and top tercile.
Common and allocation component: An additional way to test whether changes in TFP
are driven by poor allocation of resources is to decompose industry TFP into8
7In general, firms’ land is geographically more concentrated than structures. Using land values
mitigates the potential bias arising from using state level house prices if structures are scattered across
the country and not near the headquarter. As land does not depreciate, it also alleviates concerns about
the correct adjustment to firms’ book value of real estate based on buildings’ age. Similarly, I will show
that results also hold for manufacturing firms only, which exhibit geographic clustering, unlike firms in
the service sector.
8For each industry, let yi =
∑Mi
f=1 yf , ki =
∑Mi
f=1 kf , and li =
∑Mi
f=1 lf denote industry output,
capital and labor as a sum across Mi firms f in industry i. Also, denote industry-wide averages as
y¯i =
yi
Mi
, k¯i =
ki
Mi
, and l¯i =
li
Mi
. Then we can decompose industry TFP Ai into an industry mean, as
well as a covariance term:
Ai =
yi
kαi l
1−α
i
=
∑Mi
f=1
[
yf
kαf l
1−α
f
kαf l
1−α
f
]
kαi l
1−α
i
Mi
Mi
=
1
Mi
Mi∑
f=1
yf
kαf l
1−α
f︸ ︷︷ ︸
Af
kαf l
1−α
f
k¯αi l¯
1−α
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
wf
= Af · wf ,
Making use of u · v = u¯ · v¯ + cov(u, v), we can decompose the above expression into equation (1).
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Ai =
(
1
Mi
Mi∑
f=1
yf
kαf l
1−α
f
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯i
(
1
Mi
Mi∑
f=1
kαf l
1−α
f
k¯αi l¯
1−α
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
w¯i
+cov(wf , Af ) = A¯iw¯i + cov(wf , Af ), (1)
where wf denotes the relative weight of firm f , and Af is firm productivity. A¯iw¯i denotes
the unconditional industry mean. The latter term cov(wf , Af ) denotes the covariance
between firm size and firm productivity within each industry, which I call the allocation
component. If productive firms are also larger, industry productivity is above the un-
conditional mean, otherwise below. A reallocation in terms of relative weights implies
that unproductive firms increase their size and rising house prices should have a negative
impact on the covariance term.
NBER manufacturing database Compustat covers large, listed firms, which differ
from the average firm in the economy. To increase the external validity of my results,
I additionally use the NBER manufacturing database. For each four digit industry,
I analyze how changes in the value of structures affect investment, employment and
productivity. I additionally analyze the employment effects for low- and high-skilled
workers separately. For variable definitions, see Section B. The manufacturing database
uses census information and is thus representative of the entire US manufacturing sector.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The Compustat firm sample ranges from 1993 to 2008 and comprises 5,478 firms with
48,462 firm-year observations in 349 two-digit industries. The average industry has 36.6
firms per year, with a maximum of 296. For the median firm in the sample, real estate
comprises 24 % of fixed assets. In total, 60.2 % of all firms report non-zero real estate
holdings. In general, Compustat contains large companies. The median firm is 34 years
old and has 662 employees. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the full sample, split
into high and low real estate owning firms (defined as bottom and top tercile). Real
estate owning firms are larger and older, but significantly less productive. They have a
higher capital-to-labor ratio, but lower debt and investment rates.
Figure 1 shows the kernel density plot of log(TFP), conditional on industry fixed
effects, with firms split into bottom and top tercile by real estate value. The solid line
of firms with high real estate is left of the dashed line for firms with low real estate (as
share of fixed assets). Average productivity is lower for real estate holding firms. The
difference is highly significant, as I will show below. Importantly, real estate owning firms
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have persistently lower levels of productivity: the autocorrelation of TFP is 0.8. Table 2
shows summary statistics for the industry level, again split into terciles of real estate. On
the industry level, the sample is relatively balanced. Low and high real estate industries
have similar values for employment, capital, and capital-to-labor ratio. Low real estate
industries have higher growth in investment, labor productivity and TFP.
3 Empirical Strategy
In this section I describe the empirical strategy to identify how changes in house prices
affect firm characteristics and subsequently industry aggregates.
3.1 Firm Level
The firm-level baseline regression is
yf,t = β · real estate valuef,t + controlsf,t + δf + τs×t + f,t, (2)
where yf,t is firm f ’s debt, investment, employment, or value added in year t, all stan-
dardized by lagged fixed assets. real estate valuef,t corresponds to real estate value over
lagged fixed assets. controlsf,t include firm characteristics log of total assets, return on
assets, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, as well as the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
index of financial constraints. Variables δf denote firm fixed effects, τs×t time-varying
fixed effects at the state and/or industry level. Higher real estate value should relax
financing constraints and allow firms to increase their debt levels to expand investment
and output. We expect β > 0. Note that on the firm level, I run level regressions with
firm fixed effects. Hence, I look at variation within each firm relative to its average. I
interpret my results in terms of changes: an increase in real estate value relative to a
firm’s mean increases/decreases the respective dependent variable relative to its mean.9
Rising collateral value should matter more for financially constrained companies, as
it increases the value of pledgeable assets. To test this I interact real estate value with
different metrics of financial constraints. As measures of financial constraints I consider
firms’ payout ratio and size; their Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) and Whited-Wu (WW) index
(Whited and Wu, 2006), where I split firms into bottom and top tercile; and whether
they have an S&P bond rating. The effect is expected to be stronger for constrained
firms.
9Around 40 % of my firm-level observations report zero real estate value. In growth regressions, I
would lose a significant share of my sample.
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Various potential problems plague a clear identification of the effect of real estate
prices on firm performance and industry outcomes. First, there could be reverse causality.
Suppose a very large firm expands investment and hires new employees. The direct
demand for real estate through investment, but also the indirect increase in real estate
demand through higher demand for intermediate goods or higher wages of households
could then lead to increases in house prices. To address the issue, I instrument house
prices through local housing supply elasticity, interacted with long-term interest rates
(Saiz, 2010; Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). The idea is that decreases in long-term
interest rates lead to higher demand for housing. How strong house prices react depends
on local supply elasticity. If it is cheap to build new houses and increase supply, for
example in a city bordering desert, then a decrease in long-term rates will have a modest
effect on housing prices. If housing supply elasticity is low, because developable space is
limited by mountains or water, the increase in demand will translate into higher prices.
For the US sample, I use data on local housing supply elasticity on the MSA level and
run the following first-stage regression:
Pt,msa = γ · elasticitymsa ×mortgage ratet + δmsa + τt + t,msa, (3)
where Pt,msa is the residential real estate price index on MSA-level, elasticitymsa denotes
local housing elasticity at MSA level, and mortgage ratet reflects aggregate shifts in the
mortgage refinancing rate, adjusted for inflation. The regression includes MSA (δmsa)
and year (τt) fixed effects, as well as clustered standard errors at the MSA level. The
identifying assumption is that increases in firms’ local demand for real estate do not affect
the economy-wide mortgage rate and are uncorrelated with supply elasticities.
To control for unobserved demand factors, I include time-varying fixed effects on the
state-year and industry-year level. These absorb any common industry and state shocks
in each year (Gormley, 2010). Additionally, I follow Mian and Sufi (2014) and categorize
industries into tradable and non-tradable sectors according to their geographic concen-
tration (as well as service vs. manufacturing). The intuition is that firms operating in the
tradable sector can produce at one location, but sell their products everywhere. Firms
in the non-tradable sector need to set up shop where demand is. If local demand raises
house prices and demand for goods, firms in the non-tradable sector should increase out-
put by more, as they depend on local demand. For each industry, I construct a Herfindahl
index that reflects its share of employment that falls in each state. Industries with high
concentration are in the tradable sector, and those with low in the non-tradable.10
10Highly concentrated non-tradable industries are predominantly food, grocery stores, or IT and
garment retailers. Tradable industries comprise various goods that can be shipped and consumed every-
where, for example beverages, dairy or aircraft and parts.
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3.2 Industry Level
To test whether the reallocation of resources across firms lowers aggregate productivity,
I aggregate my data to the four-digit industry level. All aggregate variables are value
added-weighted averages of firm level variables. If real estate owning firms are less pro-
ductive, industries with stronger increases in firms’ real estate values should see a decrease
in productivity. I estimate
∆log(tfp)i,t = α ·∆real estate valuei,t + controlsi,t + δi + τt + i,t, (4)
where i denotes industry, ∆log(tfp) is the log difference of total factor productivity, and
∆real estate value is the log difference real estate value of i. Both are industry averages,
weighted by firm value added. controls are industry sales growth, industry capital-labor
ratio, as well as weighted averages of firms’ return on assets and size. As above, δi denotes
industry fixed effects and τt are time-varying fixed effects at the two-digit industry level
or year fixed effects. We expect that industries with higher real estate growth experience
more misallocation and have lower TFP growth, which implies α < 0.
The underlying mechanism for relative reallocation is an asymmetric relaxation of
firms’ collateral constraints. If all firms in one industry have the same real estate value in
each year, all would expand equally and there would be no reallocation. Hence, a prereq-
uisite for misallocation is variation in real estate value across firms within each industry.
I calculate the initial standard deviation in real estate value across firms (dispersioni,93)
and estimate equation (4) on subsamples with high and low dispersion, defined as top and
bottom terciles. When house prices rise, reallocation should be stronger for industries
with higher initial dispersion. Firms with high initial real estate value expand at the
expense of firms with low real estate value, which exacerbates poor resources allocation
within industries. Industries with little or no dispersion should not suffer from a change in
relative weights and hence no misallocation. Thus, α is expected to be strongly negative
within industries with high dispersion.
The decline in productivity is driven by an increase in the size of unproductive firms,
relative to productive firms. In a counterfactual scenario, I fix firms’ size at the beginning
of the sample period and shut down the reallocation channel. Industry productivity Ai
is a weighted average of firm productivity Af , so Ai,t =
∑
f θf,tAf,t, where θf,t is firms’
share of total value added each year. Fixing the share θf,t = θf,1993 at its initial 1993
value gives the effect of rising real estate value on industry productivity when there is no
misallocation. Specifically, I estimate
∆log(tfp)i,t =
2008∑
t=1993
γt ·∆real estate valuei,t × yeart + controlsi,t + δi + τt + i,t, (5)
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where yeart is a dummy with value 1 in the respective year. To run equation (5), I
aggregate in two ways: i) with time-varying value added shares θf,t (time-varying VA),
and ii) with shares fixed at the beginning of the sample, θf,1993 (fixed VA). If reallocation
is the driving force of declining productivity growth, estimating (5) under fixed value-
added shares should produce non-negative and insignificant coefficients γt. The difference
between coefficients under both scenarios can then be attributed to reallocation of capital
and labor towards inefficient firms.
4 Results
This section first shows that an increase in the value of a firm’s real estate increases
its long-term debt. Firms use the funds to increase output and expand. In a second
step, I explore the effects of the relative increase in size of real estate owning firms on
aggregate productivity. The average real estate holding firm has lower productivity than
the average non-real estate holding firm. Industries with stronger increases in real estate
value see a sharper decline in productivity.
4.1 Firm Level
Table 3 shows that firms that saw a stronger rise in their real estate value also increased in
size. An increase in real estate value increases long-term debt, investment, employment,
and value added. For each dependent variable, I run a parsimonious regression with firm
fixed effects only, as well as one saturated with controls and time-varying fixed effects on
the industry and state level.11 The structure of fixed effects absorbs any common shocks
within each industry and state. For each dependent variable, there is a significant positive
effect of real estate that is similar across specifications. This highlights that common
shocks are unlikely to drive results. A one-dollar increase in real estate value increases
long-term debt by 15.4 cents (column (2)), investment by 3.5 cents (column (4)), and
employment by 1.6 employees per thousand dollars of fixed assets (column (6)). Finally,
also firms’ value added increases significantly in columns (7)-(8). Values in brackets
denote coefficients when dependent and independent variables are standardized to mean
zero and standard deviation of one. Under the full specification, a one standard deviation
increase in real estate increases all dependent variables by 0.15-0.20 standard deviations.
Note that labor responds stronger than investment. To provide further evidence that
rising real estate values relax collateral constraints, the online appendix interacts real
11The stepwise addition of controls and fixed effects does not alter the result (unreported).
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estate value with different definitions of financial constraints. If rising asset prices work
through the collateral channel, they should have a stronger effect on firms that face tighter
constraints. For all metrics of financial constraints, the coefficient on the interaction term
is significant and positive. In line with theory, rising collateral value has stronger effects
on constrained firms
Having established that firms raise new debt in response to an increase in collateral
value, which they spend to invest and hire additional employees, Table 4 shows that
real estate owning firms have a lower level of productivity. I estimate equation (2) with
log(TFP ) as dependent variable with subsequent addition of controls and fixed effects. I
am interested in a comparison across firms, so I do not include firm fixed effects. Column
(1) is simple pooled OLS and shows a strong negative correlation between real estate value
and productivity. Column (2) includes year fixed effects, and Column (3) time-varying
fixed effects at the industry level and thus compares firms within 4-digit industries. All
three columns show that firms with higher real estate holdings have significantly lower
productivity than their peers with low real estate value. Finally, column (4) controls for
firm size and age, results remain similar. For the sample of firms with positive real estate
values, moving a firm from the 10th to the 90th percentile reduces productivity by 5.7 %
in column (4), or alternatively 11.8 % in column (2).12 Taken together, the results in
Table 3 and 4 show that a rise in real estate value disproportionately relaxes borrowing
constraints for low productivity firms, even after controlling for firm size and age, as well
as industry characteristics.
Interlude: Why are real estate owning firms less productive? This section
established that real estate owning firms have persistently lower levels of productivity.
For its negative effect on aggregate productivity, the underlying reason why firms that
hold real estate are inefficient does not matter. As long as rising real estate prices
allocate capital and labor towards inefficient firms, TFP growth declines. None the
less, to shed some light on why productivity and real estate are negatively correlated,
Figure 2 offers some suggestive evidence. Panel (a) plots firms’ average probability of
increasing capitalized leases, buildings, or land against firm age.13 While young firms
are more likely to hold capitalized leases, as they grow older, they are more likely to
buy real estate (buildings and land).14 Panel (b) plots firms’ average investment rate
and sales growth against firm age. Younger firms have higher investment and growth
12Results are robust to alternative metrics of productivity (labor productivity, TFP estimated with
Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin.
13For each firm, I define a dummy equal to 1 if present book value of the asset is higher than last
year’s, i.e. if the firm buys more of the asset.
14The online appendix confirms these descriptive results with regressions. In all regressions, older
firms are more likely to hold buildings and land, and less likely to own capitalized leases.
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rates, a common finding in the literature (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012;
Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2013). While no definite evidence, the picture that
emerges is the following: Young firms are productive and fast growing, but do not buy real
estate − potentially because they have better outside investment options or not enough
capital to finance objects on such large scale. Only at later stages in their life do they
increase their share of real estate assets. However, as older firms have lower investment
rates and productivity growth (Alon, Berger, Pugsley and Dent, 2017), a higher share
of real estate assets coincides with weaker performance. When real estate prices rise,
collateral constraints are relaxed for older, but unproductive firms. This being said, after
controlling for firm age, real estate owning firms are still significantly less productive.
The effects of misallocation on industry productivity are due to persistently lower lev-
els of productivity of collateral-owning firms. Thus, it is important that looser constraints
do not lead to an improvement in firms’ productivity growth. Otherwise, they affect ag-
gregate TFP not only through reallocation across firms, but also through changes within
firms’ productivity.15 Table 5 uses firms’ TFP growth ∆TFPf as dependent variable
and shows that there is a weak negative, but mostly insignificant relationship between
real estate value and firm productivity (all regressions include firm fixed effects and thus
compare within firm changes). Columns (1)-(3) consecutively add fixed effects and con-
trols. Only in column (3) with firm and industry∗year fixed effects, as well as controls, an
increase in real estate value by one unit (which corresponds to a 100 % increase) reduces
TFP growth significantly, by 1 %. However, the effect disappears over time (columns
(4)-(6)). Firms do not use additional credit to pursue unproductive investment projects
and the effect of changes in within-firm productivity on aggregate TFP is negligible. As
I will show, industry results confirm that poor allocation of capital and labor reduces
growth, which reassures me that a mechanic decline in revenue productivity when collat-
eral constraints are relaxed is not driving aggregate results.
4.2 Industry Level
Section 4.1 established that when firms see a rise in their real estate value, they increase
their debt to finance additional investment and production. Real estate holding firms in-
crease their relative share of industry-wide output. Relaxing collateral constraints thereby
leads to a reallocation of resources towards unproductive real estate owning firms. This
section shows that changes on the firm level have negative aggregate consequences.
Table 6 demonstrates that productivity growth is significantly lower within industries
15For literature on loan supply and firm productivity, see Doerr, Raissi and Weber (2017); Duval,
Hong and Timmer (2017); Heil (2017).
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that see a stronger increase in real estate value. Column (1) uses industry fixed effects.
TFP and real estate value have a strong negative correlation. A 10 % increase in real
estate growth, which corresponds to 2.5 years, reduces TFP growth by 0.6 %.16 Column
(2) adds year fixed effects, column (3) time-varying fixed effects at the two-digit industry
level. The latter absorb common shocks to industries within each two-digit industry
cluster. Columns (4)-(6) add industry controls. In all specifications, higher growth in
real estate value reduces industry productivity − in the most demanding specification in
column (6), a 10 % appreciation of real estate value reduces TFP growth by around 0.62
%.17
As explained in Section 3.2, if misallocation lies at the heart of the problem, i) the
covariance between firm size and productivity within each industry should decline, and
ii) misallocation should be worse in industries with higher initial dispersion in real estate
value across firms. Table 7, columns (1)-(2) use the decomposed elements of productivity,
the common and covariance terms, as dependent variables. All variables are standardized
to mean zero and standard deviation of one. Column (1) shows that industries with a
stronger increase in real estate value see an insignificant fall in their unconditional mean.
In contrast, column (2) reports that there is a significant decline in the covariance between
firm size and productivity within industries. Thus, unproductive firms increased their
size by more.18 Columns (3) and (4) show the results of estimating equation (4) for
industries in the bottom (low disp.) and top (high disp.) tercile of dispersion. While the
effect is insignificant and negative in column (3), it is strongly and significantly negative
for industries with high dispersion in column (4). A 10 % increase in real estate growth
decreases productivity by 1.12 % within industries with high dispersion.
Finally, Figure 4 plots the coefficients of estimating equation (5) for fixed and time-
varying value added shares. The short-dashed line under fixed shares is always above zero
(coefficients γt are positive but insignificant in all but one year), while the long-dashed line
for time-varying value added is always below zero (coefficients are negative and significant
for half of the years). The solid blue line is the difference between the two. It shows that,
16Average growth of the FRED’s All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States was around
4 % for the sample period.
17The online appendix shows that the effect is insensitive to alternative TFP metrics and nearly twice
as strong for labor productivity.
18A common finding in the literature is that the covariance between firm size and productivity varies
significantly across industries. The online appendix shows results for quantile regressions with the co-
variance (cov.) component as dependent variable for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile.
Confirming findings in Table 7, there is a significant negative effect of real estate growth on the covari-
ance term. Rising real estate prices lead to worse allocation of resources within industries with high
dispersion (lower percentiles). This suggests that industries that already suffer from poor allocation of
capital and labor are hardest hit. In addition, I confirm that the allocation component has a significant
positive effect on log(TFP), which further supports the finding that rising real estate prices lead to
misallocation and thereby reduce TFP.
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when shutting down the misallocation channel, there is no effect of real estate growth
on industry productivity. In contrast, if we allow firm size to change with rising real
estate value, there is a significant negative effect of real estate growth on TFP growth,
which gets stronger over time. Misallocation seems to accelerate on from the early 2000s,
when house price growth sped up. This is consistent with a contemporaneous decline in
economy-wide productivity growth as found in Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda
(2016). In conclusion, a rise in collateral value increases output of unproductive firms,
which leads to misallocation of capital and labor across firms. Consequently, aggregate
productivity falls, and more so in industries with larger initial variance in firms’ real
estate value.
Table 8 shows that results hold true for the NBER manufacturing sample that covers
also small firms. An increase in real estate value growth increases industries’ investment
and employment growth, but reduces productivity growth. As above, for each depen-
dent variable, I run a parsimonious pooled OLS regression, as well as one saturated with
controls, industry and year fixed effects.19 Higher real estate growth increases industries’
investment (columns (1)-(2)) and employment (columns (3)-(4)). Focusing on columns
(5)-(6), we see that a 10 % increase in real estate growth reduces industry productivity
growth by around 0.86 %. The effect is statistically and economically significant and in
line with results for the Compustat sample. It is larger in magnitude, which could reflect
that small firms (that are not covered by the Compustat sample, but part of the man-
ufacturing database) are more sensitive to house price fluctuations (Fort, Haltiwanger,
Jarmin and Miranda, 2013).
Table 9 reports that the increase in employment growth is mainly driven by an ex-
pansion of low-skilled workers (column (1)), while the effect is weaker for high-skilled
workers (column (2)). Unfortunately, the level of aggregation does not allow for a more
detailed analysis, but the shift towards low-skilled workers could potentially reflect mis-
allocation towards firms with a high share of low-skilled workers and low productivity.
Finally, columns (3) and (4) decompose productivity into the mean and covariance com-
ponent for each two-digit industry. The significant decline in the mean suggests that
the individual four-digit industry became less productive (as shown above, within each
industry, resources are allocated towards inefficient firms). The insignificant decline in
the covariance component suggests that allocation across industries is of second order
importance.
Long-run effects To analyze the long-run response of productivity to a shock to real
estate values, I estimate a panel VAR using Compustat data aggregated to the industry-
19The stepwise addition of controls and fixed effects does not alter the result (unreported).
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year level. Specifically, for industry i in year t I estimate
Yi,t = A(L)Ys,t + δi + τt + i,t,
where Y is a vector of covariates including industry real estate value (log difference),
log(TFP), the covariance component of firm size and firm productivity, and industry
sales growth. δi are industry and τt time fixed effects. i,t are innovations (what I will
call shocks) to variables in Y . A(L) is a lag operator, where L denotes the number of
lags. Based on information criteria MBIC, MAIC, and MQIC I choose a lag of 2.
I am interested in the impulse response function (IRF) of covariance and TFP to
real estate price shocks. Using a panel VAR approach has several advantages. First,
it allows each industry to have a different underlying structure through industry fixed
effects; common shocks to all industries are absorbed through τt.
20 Second, ordering of
variables by relative exogeneity provides orthogonalized IRFs (OIRF), e.g. the response
of productivity to an orthogonal shock in house prices, while holding other variables in
the system constant. To this end, I include industry sales growth to control for changes in
industry demand. Lastly, panel VARs do not require any functional form for estimation,
which allows for high flexibility.
Getting OIRFs requires an ordering of variables by relative exogeneity. The first
variable affects the following variables contemporaneously and with a lag. The second
variable affects the following variables contemporaneously and with a lag, but the first
with a lag only, etc (so variables are ordered by relative exogeneity to each other). As first
variable, I choose industries’ real estate values. I showed above that rising house prices
affect productivity through reallocation contemporaneously. It is reasonable to assume
that, if reallocation changes house prices through changes in aggregate productivity, it
will do so with a lag. As second variable, I include industry sales growth as a proxy
for demand. Changing collateral values might affect demand through different channels
(input-output linkages, local spillovers, etc), so including sales growth will ensure that
the responses of TFP and covariance are not driven by contemporaneous demand shocks.
I remain agnostic about the relative ordering of covariance and productivity.21
Figures 3 shows cumulative orthogonalized impulse response functions of log(TFP)
in panels (a) and (b), and the unconditional industry productivity mean, as well as the
allocation component in panels (c) and (d). Thin lines denote 90 % confidence intervals.
Panel (a) shows a persistent negative effect of real estate growth on industry productivity.
The effect is significant for four years. Panel (b) splits the industry sample into industries
20I use a Helmert transformation to control for industry fixed effects. For details, see Love and
Zicchino (2006).
21The ordering of TFP and covariance has no effect on results (unreported).
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with low (black line) and high (blue dashed line) initial dispersion in collateral values
across firms. In line with findings above, the negative effect in panel (a) is entirely due
to industries with high initial dispersion. Finally, panels (c) and (d) show that there is
no effect on unconditional industry productivity, but a strong and persistent negative
effect on the covariance term. Panel VAR regressions thus confirm the main findings for
the industry level OLS and fixed effects regressions in section 4.2, and show that there
are persistent negative effects of rising collateral values on industry productivity through
resource allocation.
5 Robustness
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns Table 10 shows results for the instrumental vari-
able regression (3). Column (1) reports the first stage and a highly significant effect of
the instrument on real estate prices. Columns (2)-(5) show that all baseline results hold
true for instrumented house prices (real estate is standardized). Firms that see a stronger
increase in instrumented real estate value expand more, but have lower productivity.22
Additionally, in the online appendix, real estate values are inflated by census region
commercial real estate prices. The correlation between state-level house price index and
commercial real estate prices at the regional level is 0.86. Results are similar to baseline
findings in terms of sign, size, and significance.
Changes in real estate prices could also be driven by high consumer demand. If
demand for real estate rises hand in hand with demand for goods, then changes in demand
drive increases in debt and investment, as well as in real estate value. I use a battery
of time-varying fixed effects at the state and industry level in the baseline regressions.
State∗year (industry∗year) fixed effects absorb all unobserved time-varying characteristics
that vary at the state (industry) level. Thus, the identifying assumption is that each year
demand changes equally for all firms within each state (industry). Results in Table 3
show that coefficients are insensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects.
Additionally, I follow Mian and Sufi (2014) and categorize industries into tradable and
non-tradable sectors according to their geographic concentration (or service vs. manu-
facturing). The intuition is that firms operating in the tradable sector can produce at
one location, but sell their products everywhere. Firms in the non-tradable sector need
to set up shop where demand is. If local demand raises house prices and demand for
22In Column (1) the corresponding F-statistic is 22.76. and the incremental R2 equals 0.06. Com-
paring coefficients of IV and non-IV MSA-level regressions, coefficients are about 40 % larger under the
instrumented specification, which suggests that firm demand for inputs and labor does not drive increases
in real estate value.
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goods, firms in the non-tradable sector should increase output by more, as they depend
on local demand. For each industry, I construct a Herfindahl index that reflects its share
of employment that falls in each state. Industries with high concentration are in the
tradable sector, and those with low concentration in the non-tradable.23 Table 11 shows
that effects are similar for tradable and non-tradable industries classified by geographic
concentration in columns (1)-(2), and service vs. manufacturing in columns (3)-(4).24
Davidoff (2015) raises the concern that migration of skilled workforce to geographically
attractive areas could raise property prices, as well as human capital, and invalidate
supply elasticity as an instrument. If highly skilled and well paid workers prefer to live
in scenic areas with lakes or mountains, firms face higher property prices and a workforce
with high human capital. If firms with high real estate values are located in “supercities”,
while those with low real estate values lie in areas with low human capital, this could
bias results.25 To address the issue I focus on MSAs with a similar number of firms with
and without real estate. I categorize MSAs according to their absolute distance in the
number of real estate owning firms minus non-owners, standardized by total number of
firms in the MSA. MSAs with a high (low) value of distance have a high (low) share of
real estate owning firms. MSAs with intermediate distance values have similar shares.
Under the assumption that workers do not discriminate among firms based on their real
estate onwership, changes in human capital affect all firms within the same MSA equally.
Table 11, columns (6)-(7) show that results hold even within narrowly defined MSA areas.
They use long-term debt as dependent variable, and restrict the distance of firms’ real
estate value to lie in the 10th to 90th and 25th to 75th percentile bracket in each MSA
(results extend to investment, employment, and value added). Higher real estate value
leads to significantly more long-term debt by firms in areas with similar human capital.
Finally, column (5) uses a permanent sample of firms active over the full sample period,
to avoid selection effects through exit. Results remain stable.
Online Appendix The Online Appendix provides further extensions. It shows that
• effects found in my main regressions map to the standard Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
framework of dispersion in marginal products: industries with high variation in
collateral values across firms see a strong increase in the dispersion of marginal
23Highly concentrated non-tradable industries are predominantly food, grocery stores, or IT and
garment retailers. Tradable industries comprise various goods that can be shipped and consumed every-
where, for example beverages, dairy or aircraft and parts.
24I only show effects on long-term debt, but results hold for employment and investment.
25On the industry level, this would work against my results. If migration by better skilled work-
force increases productivity for firms in areas with strong house price increases, the negative effects of
misallocation from non-owning to owning firms would be understated.
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products of capital.
• estimates are robust to alternative TFP estimation methods, as well as including
housing as a factor of production
• effects of rising real estate prices on firm debt and output are stronger for financially
constrained firms
• including firms that entered after 1993 does not change main results, i.e. that
cohort effects and the changing composition of publicly held firms (driven by the
IT sector during the 1990’s) do not significantly alter results
• an improving industry covariance between firm size and productivity also increases
industry productivity
• rising house prices not only increase employment, but also local industry wages,
which could lead to negative spillovers through factor linkages on firms that do not
own collateral
6 The Role of the Financial Sector
Previous sections established that inefficient firms borrowed more during the housing
boom. In turn, they increased their output and relative weight in the economy. This
triggered a reallocation of resources towards inefficient firms that reduced industry pro-
ductivity. In this section, I take a closer look at the role of the financial sector. I establish
that banks with superior monitoring technology or information about firms contributed
less to the credit boom. Specifically, borrowers in banks’ area of expertise (measured
by industry specialization) have a lower sensitivity of debt with respect to increases in
collateral value. In other words, if a bank knows the quality of a firm, collateral is less
important for firms’ access to credit.
Detailed syndicated loan market data on the firm-bank-year level allows me to analyze
the effect of bank specialization on loan supply. Syndicated loans are issued jointly by a
group of banks to a single borrower. A lending syndicate entails at least one lead bank,
which assesses the quality of the borrower, as well as other participating banks. Lead
banks negotiate the terms and conditions of each loan and also monitor the borrower
while the loan is active. Compared to other types of bank lending syndicated loans are
on average bigger in volume, issued to large borrowers, and often used to diversify credit
risk. Dealscan provides exhaustive information on transactions, including the issuing
syndicate of banks and borrowing firm, outstanding amount, maturity, and interest rates.
Additionally, it provides information on firms’ and banks’ type, location, and industry.26
26Total syndicated lending increased from about 500 billion U.S. Dollars in 1990 to a peak of nearly
five trillion U.S. Dollars in 2007. It is a major source of financing for many large US companies.
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To allocate loan portions of transactions I split up the loan facility on a pro-rata basis
among all participating banks in the syndicate.27 I remove transactions with deal status
‘canceled’. Total outstanding loan volume is calculated as the sum of the value of all
outstanding loans that a firm has from a bank in a given year. All loans are kept active
until maturity. I then standardize firms’ total outstanding loan volume by lagged fixed
assets and winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentile each year.
Bank specialization Banks specialize − a common finding is that banks have better
information about firms in their main industries, compared to firms in industries that
lie outside banks’ area of expertise (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Loutskina and
Strahan, 2011; Giannetti and Saidi, 2017). To measure industry specialization on the
bank-4-digit industry-year level I use syndicated loan market data to define:
specializationb,i,t =
∑F
f=1 loanb,f,t∑I
i=1
∑F
f=1 loanb,f,t
, (6)
where loan denotes loan volume between bank b and firm f in year t. The numerator
sums across all loans by bank b to firms f in industry i − it represent the total loan
volume by bank b to industry i in year t. The denominator equals total bank lending in
year t to all firms across all industries I. specialization reflects the yearly share of loans
extended by each bank to a given industry. For each year, I classify bank-industry pairs
into top and bottom tercile by specialization, and define the dummy specializedb,i,t. It
equals 1 if banks’ loan share (as measured by specializationb,i,t) to industry i is in the
top tercile for any given year, and 0 if it is in the bottom tercile. I then run the following
set of regressions:
loanf,b,t/assetsf,t = β1real estate valuef,t + controlsf,t + f,b,t
if specializedb,i,t = 0/1
(7)
loanf,b,t/assetsf,t = β1real estate valuef,t + β2specializedb,i,t
+ β3real estate valuef,t × specializedb,i,t + controlsf,t + f,b,t
(8)
loan/assets denotes syndicated loan volume between firm f and bank b in year t, standard-
ized by firm fixed assets. All regressions absorb industry shocks through industry*year
fixed effects. Additionally, I control for unobservable changes in loan supply (to isolate
demand effects) through bank*year fixed effects. Finally I control for firm characteristics
through firm fixed effects, as well as firm controls size, return on assets, and Tobin’s q.
Each regression uses clustered standard errors at the state-year level. If collateral is more
27I keep lead arrangers and participating banks in the sample. I want to contrast specialized banks with
superior information with non-specialized banks. Keeping lead arrangers only introduces the problem
that arrangers tend to be better informed about borrowers in the first place. However, using lead
arrangers only yields qualitatively similar results (unreported).
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important for firms if banks have little information about them, we expect that loan
volume reacts stronger for firms outside of banks’ main industries. This is, β1 is smaller
if specialized = 1, or β3 < 0.
Results in Table 12 show that loan volume responds by less if a firm borrows from a
bank that is specialized in the firm’s industry. Column (1) replicates the baseline regres-
sion on the loan level and shows that loan volume increases by 23.8 cents in response to
a one dollar increase in collateral value.28 Columns (2) and (3) split the sample into non-
specialized and specialized industries. The effect of rising collateral values on loan volume
is about 2.5 times higher if a borrower is in an industry outside of banks’ expertise. This
result is confirmed when I include an interaction term instead of splitting the sample in
column (4). The significant and negative coefficient on real estate valuef,t×specializedb,i,t
shows that loan volume increases by 14 cents less within specialized industries, when col-
lateral increases by 1 dollar. Finally, for robustness column (5) employs firm*bank fixed
effects and uses only variation within each bank-firm combination. Coefficients remain
highly significant and increase in magnitude. Results in Table 12 suggest that better
informed banks rely less on collateral values when making lending decisions.
The effect of productivity I argue that specialized banks are better at identifying
productive firms, irrespective of collateral values. To test this, I analyze whether the
sensitivity of firms’ debt with respect to collateral value depends on firm productivity. I
run the following regression:
loanf,b,t/assetsf,t =γ1real estate valuef,t + γ2real estate valuef,t × productivityf
+ controlsf,t + f,b,t if specializedb,i,t = 0/1,
(9)
where productivity denotes average firm productivity across the sample period, split into
three (50) percentiles. I run regression equation (9) separately for firms in non-specialized
and specialized industries.29 Hypotheses are that a) lending responds more to increases in
collateral value for firms in non-specialized industries, b) the sensitivity of lending to an
increase in real estate values is higher for high productivity firms, and c) the latter effect
is stronger within specialized industries. The reasoning is as follows. In general, banks
in specialized industries have superior screening and monitoring technologies and thus
rely less on collateral when deciding to grant a loan. However, for a given relaxation in
collateral constraints, the effect on debt should be stronger for high productivity firms, as
they can make better use of funds. Finally, if non-specialized banks can only imperfectly
discriminate between high and low productivity firms, while specialized banks can do so,
28Note that coefficients reflect loan demand, as loan supply is controlled for through time-varying
fixed effects on the bank level.
29Note that productivity is constant for each firm and thus absorbed by firm fixed effects.
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an increase in collateral value should lead to higher borrowing for high productivity firms,
especially if firms operate in banks’ main industries. Relating this to equation (9), γ1 is
expected to be larger in non-specialized industries, while γ2 is expected to be larger in
specialized industries.
Table 13 shows results for regressions equation (9). In line with hypotheses, debt
responds stronger to increases in real estate value for firms outside of specialized indus-
tries. Columns (1) and (2) use productivity terciles, (3) and (4) 50 percentiles. For both
productivity metrics, high productivity firm’s debt reacts stronger to increases in real
estate value in non-specialized industries (coefficient on real estate value). The positive
coefficient on the interaction terms suggest that high-productivity firms borrow more in
response to an increase in real estate value. However, the effect for high-productivity
firms is weaker in non-specialized industries, confirming hypothesis c). Hence, not only
do better-informed banks rely less on collateral values when granting a loan, but they are
also better able at discerning whether a borrower is of high or low quality.
Following deregulation and technological improvements, banks expanded geographi-
cally in the years prior to the 2009 crisis. While the number of banks decreased, the
number of branches per bank increased. This is also reflected in banks’ deposit diver-
sification, which increased steadily until 2007.30 Recent research suggests that expand-
ing banks rely of information-insensitive collateralized loans when entering new markets
(Loutskina and Strahan, 2011). This likely reflects that they have inferior screening and
monitoring ability compared to banks that are already present in a market and thus
have existing relationships with borrowers. Hence, banks’ geographic expansion increases
the importance of collateral in making loan decisions. As firms with a higher share of
collaterlizable assets are less productive, banks’ geographic expansion likely exacerbated
poor allocation of resources.
7 Conclusion
I show that changes in property prices affect firm decisions and aggregate productivity
through the collateral channel. During the US real estate boom from 1993 to 2008, firms
with a stronger rise in their real estate value increased debt, investment, and output. As
real estate owning firms are significantly less productive than non-owners, the relative
increase in the importance of unproductive firms triggered relative reallocation and re-
30Combining data provided by the FDIC’s Statistics on Depository Institutions and Summary of
Deposits, I compute bank diversification as 1 minus the Hefindahl index of deposit concentration. The
latter reflects each bank’s share of deposits that falls into each county.
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duced aggregate productivity. Over a 2.5 year period, a 10 % increase in real estate value
shaves off about half a percent of industry TFP growth. The covariance between firm size
and firm productivity declines and the share of low-skilled workers within an industry
increases. Results are similar for a sample of large listed US firms and the universe of US
manufacturing firms.
My findings provide direct empirical evidence for a firm-level friction that affects ag-
gregate productivity. Following pioneering work by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), so far most
studies on resource misallocation rely on abstract capital and output wedges to quantify
the effects of reallocation. Evidence on which frictions or distortions drive reallocation
and how they work over time is still scarce. My empirical evidence on the importance
of the collateral channel for reallocation sheds light on the ‘misallocation black box’. It
highlights that the joint distribution of firms’ productivity and asset holdings matters for
the evolution of aggregate variables.
My results also suggest one potential explanation of why productivity became less
cyclical over the last two decades and why the contribution of resource reallocation across
firms to aggregate TFP growth declined (Wang, 2014; Fernald and Wang, 2016; Decker,
Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2016, 2017). The misallocation of resources towards
inefficient firms during an upswing depresses aggregate productivity growth despite rising
overall economic output. An open question left to future research is whether the house
price collapse and ensuing great recession was able to undo misallocation. While reces-
sions can have a cleansing effect (Caballero and Hammour, 1994), evidence for Europe
suggests that this was not the case during the recent crisis (Borio, Kharroubi, Upper and
Zampolli, 2016).
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Figure 1: Productivity
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Note: log(TFP ) is log of total factor productivity estimated on the the two-digit industry level for production function
y = Akαl1−α. high real estate and low real estate denote top and bottom tercile of firm real estate value distribution.
TFP is standardized to mean zero and variance one and conditional on industry fixed effects. Full Sample comprises all
observations from 1993-2008.
Figure 2: Real estate, firm age, and efficiency
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(b) Firm performance by firm age
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Note: Panel (a) plots firms’ average probability of increasing capitalized leases, buildings, or land against firm age. Panel
(b) plots firms’ average investment rate and sales growth against firm age
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Figure 3: Cumulative OIRF to real estate shock
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(b) log(TFP) by dispersion
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(c) unconditional mean
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Note: Orthogonalized IRFs with 90 % confidence intervals. Response of industries’ firm size and firm productivity covari-
ance (allocation) and log(TFP) to a shock in real estate growth. Panel VAR regressions include industry and year fixed
effects. allocation and log(TFP) standardized to mean zero and variance one.
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Figure 4: Misallocation and Dispersion over time
(a) Effects of misallocation over time
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For variable definitions see section B. Left: Industry level effect of ∆real estate on ∆TFP, conditional on industry and
year fixed effects, over time. y-axis denotes coefficient of ∆real estate, interacted with year dummies. fixed VA fixes firms’
weights as value added in 1993, time-varying VA allows for time-varying weights. misallocation effect is the difference
between both lines. Series smoothed with HP filter (λ = 5). Each regression includes industry and year fixed effects, as
well as controls for sales growth, capital-labor ratio, average firm size and return on assets. Right: Yearly median of within
industry-year standard deviation of log distortions. log (distortions) refers to the residual of a regression of ln(k/l) on
industry-year dummies. dispersion stands for dispersion in initial real estate value, split into top and bottom tercile.
Table 1: Firm: Summary statistics by group
(1) (2) (3)
high RE low RE mean diff
mean sd mean sd t
real estate value 1.47 (1.46) 0.00 (0.00) 133.32
long-term debt 0.38 (0.90) 0.76 (1.43) -28.60
investment 0.21 (0.16) 0.39 (0.24) -77.66
labor 0.06 (0.07) 0.11 (0.10) -53.51
log(TFP) 0.52 (0.16) 0.57 (0.19) -20.86
employees 9775.93 (31659.67) 908.60 (4451.87) 36.23
log(assets) 5.13 (2.12) 3.45 (1.76) 79.59
leverage 0.29 (0.91) 0.26 (1.17) 2.68
return on assets 0.04 (0.22) -0.14 (0.39) 54.12
market-to-book ratio 1.82 (1.49) 2.84 (2.53) -44.45
sales growth 0.08 (0.32) 0.15 (0.55) -14.49
Kaplan-Zingales index 0.89 (2.06) 0.83 (2.76) 2.53
Whited-Wu index -0.25 (0.12) -0.15 (0.11) -80.07
Observations 16154 17620 33774
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. high RE and low RE denote top and bottom
tercile of firm real estate value distribution. mean diff is t-value for difference in means. All variables are value-added
weighted averages for the four-digit industry level.
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Table 2: Industry: Summary statistics by group (Compustat)
(1) (2) (3)
high RE low RE mean diff
mean sd mean sd t
real estate value 0.85 (0.79) 0.50 (0.46) 12.94
employment 99.10 (213.95) 115.31 (257.07) -1.60
capital 6375.94 (19099.44) 7110.87 (20194.56) -0.88
capital-labor ratio 65.61 (81.76) 61.27 (72.65) 1.31
return on assets 0.11 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05) -6.23
investment 0.21 (0.10) 0.25 (0.11) -8.14
∆ real estate 0.28 (0.34) -0.34 (0.35) 41.97
∆ investment -0.01 (0.33) -0.03 (0.31) 1.15
∆ labor 0.02 (0.32) -0.12 (0.33) 10.31
∆lp 0.00 (0.29) 0.06 (0.29) -4.13
∆tfp 0.01 (0.27) 0.04 (0.27) -2.87
Observations 1096 1097 2193
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. high RE and low RE denote top and bottom
tercile of firm real estate value distribution. mean diff is t-value for difference in means. All variables are value-added
weighted averages for the four-digit industry level.
Table 3: Debt, investment, and labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES long-term debt long-term debt investment investment labor labor value added value added
real estate value 0.199*** 0.268*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.359*** 0.303***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.033)
[.117] [.157] [.128] [.177] [.208] [.201] [.181] [.153]
market-to-book ratio -0.006 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.115***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.016)
log(assets) 0.468*** 0.024*** -0.005*** 0.162***
(0.024) (0.003) (0.001) (0.030)
return on assets -0.281*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 9.327***
(0.071) (0.008) (0.002) (0.350)
sales growth 0.352*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 1.048***
(0.029) (0.003) (0.001) (0.079)
Kaplan-Zingales index 0.124*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.089***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013)
Observations 48,462 48,430 48,462 48,430 47,372 47,305 31,457 31,056
Adjusted R-squared 0.385 0.435 0.385 0.438 0.633 0.682 0.521 0.644
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
State*Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Values in parentheses denote standard errors, in brackets coefficients for
standardized dependent and independent variables. Growth rates are log-differences. Industry∗Year and State∗Year FE
are time-varying fixed effects on the four-digit industry and state level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(tfp) log(tfp) log(tfp) log(tfp)
real estate value -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.042*** -0.034***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
firm age 0.2***
(0.007)
log(assets) 0.076***
(0.002)
Observations 31,613 31,613 31,278 31,278
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.027 0.263 0.636
Year FE - Yes - -
Industry*Year FE - - Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. log(TFP ) is log of total factor productivity estimated on the the two-digit
industry level for production function y = Akαl1−α. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Within TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t+1 t+2 t+3
VARIABLES ∆TFP ∆TFP ∆TFP ∆TFP ∆TFP ∆TFP
real estate value -0.000 -0.000 -0.010*** 0.000 -0.003* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 25,999 25,586 25,586 25,586 22,576 19,872
Adjusted R-squared -0.032 -0.012 0.139 0.155 0.025 -0.012
Firm Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - - - - -
Industry*Year FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. Columns (4)-(6) lead the dependent variable
by 1, 2, and 3 periods. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Compustat: Industry TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆tfp ∆tfp ∆tfp ∆tfp ∆tfp ∆tfp
∆ real estate -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.072*** -0.062***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
capital-labor ratio 0.009 -0.059 0.296
(0.244) (0.237) (0.212)
sales growth 0.179*** 0.128***
(0.033) (0.031)
return on assets 2.282***
(0.151)
log(assets) 0.023**
(0.009)
Observations 3,235 3,235 3,224 3,224 3,224 3,224
Adjusted R-squared -0.019 0.005 0.059 0.059 0.080 0.190
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE - Yes - - - -
2-digit*Year FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. 2-digit∗Year FE are time-varying fixed effects
on the two-digit industry level. All variables are value added weighted averages on the four-digit industry level. Key: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7: Compustat: Initial dispersion and misallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample full sample low disp. high disp.
VARIABLES mean covariance ∆tfp ∆tfp
∆ real estate -0.007 -0.022** -0.045 -0.112***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.030) (0.029)
Observations 3,282 3,175 1,077 1,073
Adjusted R-squared 0.785 0.454 0.148 0.184
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: or variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. All variables are value added weighted averages
on the four-digit industry level. mean and covariance denote unconditional industry productivity and covariance between
firm size and firm productivity within each industry. disp stands for dispersion in initial real estate value, split into top
and bottom tercile. All regressions include baseline industry controls. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: NBER manufacturing: Investment, labor, and TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆ investment ∆ investment ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ TFP ∆ TFP
∆ real estate 0.590*** 0.565*** 0.057** 0.115*** -0.082*** -0.086***
(0.123) (0.120) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
skill ratio -0.039 -0.108*** -0.042
(0.171) (0.038) (0.031)
capital-labor ratio -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(energy) 0.063*** 0.037*** 0.012***
(0.018) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 7,256 7,256 7,256 7,256 7,256 7,256
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.031 0.001 0.256 0.005 0.102
Industry FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9: NBER manufacturing: Misallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ low-skilled ∆ high-skilled mean covariance
∆ real estate 0.119*** 0.085* -0.058** -0.101
(0.023) (0.048) (0.024) (0.065)
Observations 7,256 7,256 320 320
Adjusted R-squared 0.244 0.059 0.932 0.619
Industry FE Yes Yes - -
2-digit FE - - Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. All regressions include baseline industry
controls. Columns (3) and (4) are value added weighted two digit industry averages. mean and covariance denote
unconditional industry productivity and covariance between 4-digit industry size and industry productivity within each
two-digit industry. 2-digit FE are fixed effects on the two-digit industry level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: MSA IV regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First stage MSA IV MSA IV MSA IV MSA IV
VARIABLES MSA hpi long-term debt investment labor log(tfp)
elasticity × mortgage 1.280***
(0.268)
real estate value (MSA, IV) 0.180*** 0.057*** 0.024*** -0.036***
(0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
Observations 10,193 37,173 37,173 36,280 23,039
Adjusted R-squared 0.875 0.429 0.438 0.684 0.636
MSA FE Yes - - - -
Year FE Yes - - - -
Firm FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA*Year FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster MSA MSA*Year MSA*Year MSA*Year MSA*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Column (1) depicts first-stage regression of MSA-level house price index on
housing supply elasticity, interacted with country-wide 30-year mortgage rate. Columns (2)-(5) are second stage with
MSA-level instrumented real estate value and include baseline controls. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 11: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
skilled workers skilled workers
non-tradable tradable service manufacturing perm. sample p(10)-p(90) p(25)-p(75)
VARIABLES long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt
real estate value 0.174*** 0.151*** 0.111*** 0.175*** 0.140*** 0.161*** 0.192***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 19,406 12,156 20,246 28,079 27,749 38,157 22,486
Adjusted R-squared 0.402 0.450 0.452 0.412 0.373 0.434 0.411
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Bank specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
full sample not specialized specialized full sample full sample
VARIABLES loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets
real estate value 0.238*** 0.363*** 0.138*** 0.330*** 0.524***
(0.022) (0.053) (0.043) (0.036) (0.055)
specialized US 1.051*** 0.923***
(0.078) (0.166)
RE × specialized US -0.140*** -0.247***
(0.033) (0.060)
Observations 34,649 9,573 6,712 18,708 16,467
Adjusted R-squared 0.605 0.668 0.719 0.651 0.740
Bank*Firm FE - - - - Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. loans/assets is syndicated loan volume standardized by firm fixed assets.
specialized is a dummy based on banks’ industry loan shares. not specalized and specalized denote bottom and top tercile
of bank specialization. Values in parentheses denote cluster-robust standard errors. Industry∗Year FE are time-varying
fixed effects on the four-digit industry level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 13: Firm productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
not specialized specialized not specialized specialized
VARIABLES loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets
real estate value 0.343*** 0.084 0.280*** 0.044
(0.060) (0.052) (0.068) (0.068)
RE × firm productivity 0.212** 0.292***
(0.086) (0.082)
RE × firm productivity (50) 0.328*** 0.371***
(0.121) (0.124)
Observations 9,812 5,886 9,812 5,886
Adjusted R-squared 0.669 0.748 0.669 0.748
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. loans/assets is syndicated loan volume standardized by firm fixed assets.
productivity are average firm productivity percentiles. not specalized and specalized denote bottom and top tercile of bank
specialization. Values in parentheses denote cluster-robust standard errors. Industry∗Year FE are time-varying fixed effects
on the four-digit industry level. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B Variable definitions
Table 14: Variable definitions: Compustat
variable formula comment
investment capx/ppentt−1
long-term debt ltdebt/ppentt−1
sales sale/ppentt−1
labor emp/ppentt−1
size log(at) log(total assets)
market-to-book ratio (q) (at + (prcc × csho) - ceq - txdb)/at
return on assets (ROA) (opid - depam)/at
sales growth ln(salet) - ln(salet−1)
payout ratio (dvt + prstkc)/oibdp
fixed assets ppe
employees emp
buildings fatb + fatc buildings and construction
land fatp
value added sale - materials
materials (sale - oibdp) - emp × wage index wage index from SSA
capital ppent
capital-labor ratio ppent/emp
S&P credit rating spcsrc
property sales sppe
tfp ln(y)− α ln(ppe)− (1− α) ln(emp) on 2-digit SIC, year FE
lp value added / employees labor productivity
tfpOP TFP Olley and Pakes (1996)
tfpLP TFP Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
∆tfp ln(tfpt)− ln(tfpt−1) TFP growth rate
Additional variables to indicate financial constraints:
• Kaplan-Zingales index:
−1.002× (ib+ dp)/att−1 − 39.368× (dvc+ dvp)/att−1 − 1.315× che/att−1
+3.139× ((dltt+ dlc)/(dltt+ dlc+ seq)) + 0.283× q
• Whited-Wu index:
−0.091×(ib+dp)/att−1−0.062×(dvc+dvp)DIV POS+0.021×((dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc+seq))
−0.044× ln(at) + 0.102× ISG− 0.035× sales growth
where: DIVPOS is a dummy equal one if firms paid dividends in year t, and ISG
is industry sales growth
I define five metrics of financial constraints: payout ratio, firm size, bond rating, KZ and
WW index (payout, KZ, and WW winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th). For each variable,
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I group firms into lower and upper four percentiles for each year. A firm is defined as
constrained if:
• its payout is low
• it is small
• it has a high KZ or WW index value
• it has no bond rating and positive long-term debt.
Table 15: Variable definitions: NBER manufacturing
variable formula comment
investment invest/capt−1
employment emp
real estate plant/capt−1 structures
skill ratio (emp-prode)/emp share of non-production workers
capital-labor ratio cap/emp
energy energy
low-skilled prode production workers
high-skilled emp-prode non-production workers
capital cap
∆TFP dtfp4 four-factor productivity growth
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C Online Appendix
C.1 Further Figures and Tables
Distortions and dispersion In their seminal paper, Hsieh and Klenow (HK, 2009)
develop a framework to identify distortions, or wedges, to firms’ capital and labor inputs.
It is widely used to quantify productivity losses from misallocation (Page´s, 2010). In their
model, marginal revenue products of capital and labor, as well as revenue productivity,
should equate across firms if there are no distortions. The idea is that more productive
firms will have higher output, which reduces the price of their good proportionally, such
that higher productivity and lower price offset each other. Building on this benchmark,
any dispersion in revenue products or revenue productivity must reflect firm-specific dis-
tortions and thus inefficiencies arising from misallocation. 31
To back out distortions one must rely on strong assumptions about the market struc-
ture, firm-specific mark-ups, as well as the elasticity of prices in response to productivity
shocks. Specifically, prices react much less than assumed to changes in productivity.32 I
develop a simple, but more general, empirical implementation that focuses on the capital-
labor ratio, which allows me to identify changes in frictions affecting capital relative to
labor. It does not require assumptions about mark-ups or price responses. Using the HK
framework with output and capital wedges and solving the firm problem
piist = (1− τ yist)(Aistkαsistl1−αs)
σi−1
σi − wstlist − (1 + τ kist)Rstkist,
the capital-labor ratio is given by
kist
list
=
αs
1− αs
wst
Rst
1
1 + τ kist
, (10)
where i is firm, s is industry, and t time. τ k denotes a capital-specific distortion relative
to labor. An increase in τ k makes capital relatively more expensive and reduces the
capital-labor ratio. Without distortions (and mark-ups) we are back in the standard case
and k/l is solely determined by industry variables. Note that firm-specific mark-ups and
prices cancel out. Taking the logarithm, the log capital labor ratio is given by
ln
(
kist
list
)
= ln
(
αs
1− αs
)
+ ln
(
wst
Rst
)
− ln (1 + τ kist) , (11)
which can be expressed as a standard OLS regression
yist = β Xst + ist (12)
where y = ln(k/l),  = −ln (1 + τ k), and X is a vector of industry-level variables w,R,
and α. Thus, firms’ capital-labor ratio can be decomposed into an aggregate (X) and
idiosyncratic part (). The aggregate part depends on industry values of wages, rental
rates, and the production function. The idiosyncratic part reflects relative distortions on
31Note that what matters for efficiency is the dispersion across firms within an industry, not the
absolute level of a distortion for a given firm
32Recent work casts doubt on the accuracy of these assumptions, as well as the underlying data used
(Foster, Grim, Haltiwanger and Wolf, 2017; Rotemberg and White, 2017).
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capital inputs.
I implement equation (12) empirically by regressing ln
(
k
l
)
on a set of industry-year
dummies. The latter absorb any time-varying characteristics within each industry-year
pair that affect firms’ log capital-labor ratio. Fixed effects allow me to remain agnos-
tic about values for capital coefficients, wages and rental rates, and other (unobserved)
variables that affect industry capital-labor ratios. The residuals  are then firm specific
characteristics (distortions) that determine the deviation of capital-labor ratios from in-
dustry averages. Regressing yist on Xˆist yields an R
2 of 0.4, while regressing yist on ˆist
yields an R2 of 0.6. Thus, about two-thirds of the variation in firms’ capital-labor ratios
across firms within an industry are explained by distortions.
Figure 8 shows that there is significant dispersion in capital-labor ratios, as well as
distortions across firms. Firms in the top 10th (5th) percentile relative to the bottom 10th
(5th) in terms of capital-labor ratios use 16 (43) times as much capital per employee, while
distortions vary by a factor of 8 (18). If constraints are asymmetrically relaxed for firms,
then we expect the dispersion of distortions to increase over time. I compute the standard
deviation of  within each industry-year pair for the full sample. Additionally, following
the reasoning laid out in section 3.2, I split industries into top (bottom) tercile according
to their initial 1993 variation in real estate values across firms. Findings above showed
that industries in the top tercile see an asymmetric relaxation of financial constraints and
suffer from misallocation. Hence, they should see an increase in dispersion of distortions,
while for industries in the bottom tercile there should be no change.
Figure 4 plots the yearly median for each series. The solid line shows that for the
full sample dispersion increased. Splitting the sample into industries with high (dashed
line) and low (dotted line) variation in initial real estate values, shows that the increase
is driven by higher dispersion within industries that suffered more from misallocation.
The dashed line for industries with low variation in initial real estate value is downward
trending. Thus, rising real estate value asymmetrically relaxes firms’ financial constraints,
which increases dispersion in distortions and lowers productivity through misallocation.
Regressing log(k/l), as well as distortions , on real estate value in Table 23 yields
a significant negative coefficient. Increasing real estate value by one standard deviation
reduces firms’ capital-labor ratio by 9.5 % in column (1), where I include baseline controls
and firm and year fixed effects. Distortions  decline by 14.2 % to 8.3 % (columns (2)
to (4)), depending on the specification. Including controls in column (4) reduces the
coefficient significantly. As  = ln( 1
1+τk
), relaxing collateral constraints increases the cost
of capital relative to labor, and thus τ k. This means that firms’ increase in employment
is stronger than their increase in investment when collateral constraints are relaxed.
This is in line with firm-level regressions in Table 3, where a one standard deviation
increase in real estate value increases investment by 0.17 sd and employment by 0.20
sd.33 Interestingly, this implies that looser financial constraints affect capital and labor
to a different degree. It is therefore misleading to assume that financial constraints affect
the allocation of capital alone.
33The discrepancy is even stronger when I exclude firms with zero real estate, where investment
increases by 0.29 sd and employment by 0.37 sd.
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Loan supply Over the last twenty years banks increasingly relied on collateralized
lending (Flannery and Lin, 2016; Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay, 2018). If banks
are more willing to lend to real estate owning firms independently of the increase in
individual firms’ real estate value, results are driven by credit supply effects. Instead,
if rising real estate values relax financial constraints, firms’ credit demand increases.
Detailed syndicated loan market data on the firm-bank-year level allows me to control
for changes in the financial sector through time-varying fixed effects at the bank level
(Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´ and Saurina, 2014). Absorbing bank-
specific changes identifies the effect of increasing real estate value on firm characteristics
not driven by supply effects. In addition, I decompose loan growth into supply and
demand factors, following Amiti and Weinstein (2017).
For a sample of 3,292 firms and 2,058 banks I match 147,778 syndicated loans from
1995-2008. Syndicated loans are issued jointly by a group of banks to a single borrower.
A lending syndicate entails at least one lead bank, which assesses the quality of the
borrower, as well as other participating banks. Lead banks negotiate the terms and
conditions of each loan and also monitor the borrower while the loan is active. Compared
to other types of bank lending syndicated loans are on average bigger in volume, issued
to large borrowers, and often used to diversify credit risk. Total syndicated lending
increased from about 500 billion U.S. Dollars in 1990 to a peak of nearly five trillion U.S.
Dollars in 2007. It is a major source of financing for many large US companies. Dealscan
provides exhaustive information on transactions, including the issuing syndicate of banks
and borrowing firm, outstanding amount, maturity, and interest rates. Additionally, it
provides information on firms’ and banks’ type, location, and industry.
To allocate loan portions of transactions I split up the loan facility on a pro-rata
basis among all participating banks in the syndicate.34 I remove transactions with deal
status ‘canceled’. Total outstanding loan volume is calculated as the sum of the value
of all outstanding loans that a firm has from a bank in a given year. All loans are kept
active until maturity. I then standardize firms’ total outstanding loan volume by lagged
fixed assets and winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentile each year. All regressions include
baseline controls and fixed effects. To highlight unobservable time-varying characteristics
on the bank level, I subsequently add fixed effects varying at the bank level.
Table 22, columns (1)-(3), show results for loan volume as dependent variable. An
increase in firms’ real estate value significantly increases loan volume. Subsequently
adding bank-firm (column (2)) and bank-firm plus bank-year fixed effects (column (3))
leaves coefficients nearly unchanged. The former look at variation within a specific firm-
bank connection, while the latter additionally absorb time-varying changes within each
bank. Thus, bank-specific changes within a firm-bank connection explain only a small
part (around 1 %) of the overall effect.
[ Table 22 about here ]
Absorbing supply effects through bank-year fixed effects assumes that each bank be-
haves in identically towards all borrowers. If banks shifted their lending model from one
34Literature sometimes focuses on lead arrangers. As the focus of my work is on firms and I absorb
all bank-related changes through fixed effects, different ways to split loans make little difference.
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type of borrower to another (i.e. real estate owning firms), fixed effects will miss it. As
an additional way to rule out supply effects, columns (4)-(5) decompose syndicated loan
growth into demand and supply factors, following Amiti and Weinstein (2017).35 Changes
in a firm’s total loan growth between a bank-firm pair reflect changes in loan demand
by firms, as well as loan supply by banks. Column (4) shows that rising real estate val-
ues significantly increase firms’ loan demand, while column (5) shows that there is an
insignificant effect on supply factors. In line with columns (1)-(3), results suggest that
rising real estate values relax collateral constraints and thereby increase loan demand.
Housing as factor of production To estimate productivity, I assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function of type yft = aftκ
α
ftl
1−α
ft , where κ = k + h. k is capital and h
structures and land. If housing enters the production function separately, its true form
is yft = zftk
α
fth
β
ftl
1−α−β
ft and true productivity is given by
ln(z) = ln(y)− α ln(k)− β ln(h)− (1− α− β) ln(l),
while estimated productivity is given by
ln(a) = ln(y)− α ln(k)− β ln(h)− (1− α− β) ln(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ln(z)
+
α ln(k) + β ln(h)− α ln(k + h)− β ln(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bias
.
Estimating productivity a instead of z leads to a bias. The direction of the bias will
depend on parameter values, but in general, for firms with high β and thus high shares
of real estate, productivity will be overstated. This is, productivity would be even lower
for real estate owning firms if yft = zftk
α
fth
β
ftl
1−α−β
ft . To quantify the bias, I estimate
ln(y) = α ln(κ) + (1 − α) ln(l) and ln(y) = α ln(k) + β ln(h) + (1 − α − β) ln(l),
where κ = k + h, for the sample of real estate owning firms (53,706 obs).36 Figure 9
shows productivity distributions under both specifications, winsorized at the 2.5th and
97.5th percentile. They look almost identical with a correlation of 0.95. The mean for
the regression excluding housing is slightly, but insignificantly, higher. In conclusion,
treating housing as a separate factor of production does not affect my estimates.
[ Figure 9 about here ]
Alternatively, housing can enter the production function as an imperfect substitute for
capital in a CES-aggregator form: y = z[γkρ + (1− γ)hρ]αρ l1−α. Then true productivity
is given by
ln(z) = ln(y)− α
ρ
ln(γkρ + (1− γ)hρ)− (1− α) ln(l).
35For detailed methodology, see their paper. In principle, they impose an adding-up constraint that
ensures that adding up individual supply and demand shocks matches aggregate growth rates. This
is similar to a WLS regression of loan growth between bank b and firm f in year t on firm and bank
dummies, where weights are lagged loan shares. This identifies loan supply and loan demand factors
for each bank and firm. Summing supply factors across a firm’s lenders yields firm-specific loan supply
shocks.
36I define real estate as fatb+ fatc+ fatp and κ = ppent.
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Assume κ = γk + (1− γ)h. Then estimated productivity is given by
ln(a) = ln(y)− α ln(γk + (1− γ)h)− (1− α) ln(l)
= ln(y)− α
ρ
ln(γkρ + (1− γ)hρ)− (1− α) ln(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ln(z)
+
α
ρ
ln(γkρ + (1− γ)hρ)− α ln(γk + (1− γ)h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bias
.
The bias disappears as ρ→ 1. For a wide range of parameter values for α, ρ, γ, the bias
is negative and close to zero (around 10e−4).
Did firms acquire new structures? To check whether firms buy real estate when
property prices rise, I define a dummy variable buyer that equals one if firms acquired
real estate from year t− 1 to t, and zero otherwise. An increase in firms’ historical book
value of real estate indicates that firms bought new structures, while a decrease implies
selling or depreciation. I run logistic regressions of the form
buyersf,t = β · hpist + controlsf,t + δf + f,t, (13)
hpist is the house price index on state-level in year t, and controls include standard firm
controls. All regressions use fixed effects on the firm level. Table 24, column (1), uses
firm fixed effects and shows that firms are significantly less likely to buy structures when
house prices rise. Once year fixed effects and controls are added in columns (2)-(3), the
effect turns insignificant, with an odds ratio close to 1. In column (3), a one unite increase
in house prices decreases the probability of buying real estate by 1.6 %. Columns (4) and
(5) interact the house price index with measures of financial constraints. Results show
that there is a significant decline in the probability of buying real estate for constrained
firms. In column (5), an one unit increase in house prices reduces the probability of
buying real estate by 2.5 % for financially constrained firms. As constraints are relaxed,
firms reduce their share of real estate over total assets.
[ Table 24 about here ]
Industries driving results Figure 7 highlights that two industry subgroups stand
out. First, high-tech industries have a significant positive relationship between real estate
value and productivity. Potentially these industries require IT inputs and benefit from
rapid productivity growth in the sector. Second, industries “not elsewhere classified”,
“miscellaneous”, or “other” have a strong negative correlation. Establishments in this
sub-sector are categorized by what, and not how, they produce. The lack of specialization
might lead to higher dispersion in productivity and worse misallocation.37
[ Figure 7 about here ]
37To identify industries driving results I run equation (4) on the sample of industries with high initial
dispersion and exclude industries one for one. Highlighted industries are amplifying/muting the effect
by the most (top and bottom 5 %). For a list of industries, see Table 28.
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Table 16: Summary statistics for full sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. P5 P10 P50 P90 P95
real estate value 48462 .57 1.06 0 0 .24 1.36 2.06
long-term debt 48462 .49 1.09 0 0 .07 1.41 3.14
investment 48462 .28 .21 .04 .07 .23 .6 .73
labor 47400 .08 .09 .01 .01 .04 .19 .29
log(TFP) 31613 .54 .17 .25 .32 .54 .73 .79
employees 47400 6414.44 26035.28 26 49 662 12401 27221
log(assets) 48462 4.64 2.14 1.33 1.97 4.55 7.49 8.32
leverage 48462 .28 1.09 0 0 .18 .55 .72
return on assets 48462 -.02 .3 -.62 -.33 .06 .18 .23
market-to-book ratio 48462 2.2 1.97 .75 .87 1.54 4.36 6.21
sales growth 48462 .12 .42 -.43 -.22 .09 .49 .75
Kaplan-Zingales index 48462 .92 2.25 -1.88 -.73 .86 2.73 3.82
Whited-Wu index 48431 -.22 .12 -.42 -.38 -.22 -.06 -.01
Note: For variable definitions see section B.
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Figure 5: Investment and employment
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Note: investment is defined as capital expenditure over lagged fixed assets, employees as employees over fixed assets.
realestate is defined as value of structures and land standardized by lagged fixed assets (for details, see text). For
illustrative purpose, growth rates are averaged log difference for each firm in sample. Correlations are almost identical for
non-averaged sample. All variables winsorized at 2.5th and 97.5th percentile.
Figure 6: Productivity
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Note: log(TFP ) is log of total factor productivity estimated on the the two-digit industry level for production function
y = Akαl1−α. high real estate and low real estate denote top and bottom tercile of firm real estate value distribution.
TFP is standardized to mean zero and variance one and conditional on industry fixed effects. Full Sample comprises all
observations from 1993-2008.
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Table 17: Summary statistics by group (NBER manufacturing)
(1) (2) (3)
high RE low RE mean diff
mean sd mean sd t
real estate value 0.40 (0.12) 0.36 (0.09) 14.60
employment (in th.) 26.03 (42.02) 38.51 (57.01) -8.67
capital (in m.) 2882.80 (6247.42) 3604.24 (8071.29) -3.48
skill ratio 0.28 (0.12) 0.29 (0.12) -1.93
capital-labor ratio 130.60 (139.50) 97.36 (101.60) 9.47
investment 0.07 (0.05) 0.09 (0.04) -18.40
∆ real estate 0.02 (0.05) -0.05 (0.07) 42.11
∆ investment 0.01 (0.40) -0.04 (0.34) 4.94
∆ employment -0.03 (0.10) -0.03 (0.09) -1.82
∆ low-skilled -0.03 (0.11) -0.03 (0.10) -0.80
∆ high-skilled -0.03 (0.16) -0.02 (0.14) -2.87
∆ TFP -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (0.06) 0.05
TFP 1.15 (2.03) 1.14 (1.88) 0.10
Observations 2418 2419 4837
Note: Table 17 shows summary statistics by group for the NBER manufacturing sample. The full sample contains 458
industries with 7,256 industry-year observations. Industries with a high real estate share out of total assets are smaller
in terms of total employment and assets, and operate with a lower skill intensity. They have lower capital-labor ratios
and investment. There is no consistent difference in growth rates of investment, employment and TFP, except that high
real estate industries have slower growth in skilled workers. For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-
differences. high RE and low RE denote top and bottom tercile of firm real estate value distribution. mean diff is t-value
for difference in means.
49
Figure 7: Industries driving results
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Note: For variable definitions see section B. High-tech industries are SIC codes 3575, 7990, 3663, 2731, 3829, 3842, 7900,
2835, 3851, 3530, 8051, 5072, 8060, 2741, 5160. non-classified are 8700, 5070, 8742, 5065, 2015, 3825, 2890, 3873, 3578,
5047, 2090, 3443, 3567, 3470, 2000. Industries are top and bottom 5 % of industries whose exclusion has strongest effect
on coefficient of ∆RE on ∆TFP . All variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile, sample of high initial dispersion
industries.
Table 18: Financial constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
payout ratio small firm KZ index WW index bond rated
VARIABLES long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt
real estate value 0.122*** 0.009 0.116*** 0.097*** 0.146***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015)
RE × constrained 0.047*** 0.194*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.066*
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034)
Observations 41,547 36,469 36,352 36,594 48,462
Adjusted R-squared 0.456 0.428 0.452 0.413 0.432
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: To provide further evidence that rising real estate values relax collateral constraints, Table 18 interacts real estate
value (RE) with different definitions of financial constraints. If rising asset prices work through the collateral channel,
they should have a stronger effect on firms that face tighter constraints. The dummy constrained equals one if firms are
constrained (for detailed definitions, see Section 14). The dependent variable is long-term debt. For all metrics of financial
constraints, the coefficient on the interaction term is significant and positive. In line with theory, rising collateral value
has stronger effects on constrained firms. For variable definitions see section B. constrained denotes different measures of
financial constraints, as indicated by the column title. Each constrained is a dummy with value 1 if the firm is constrained,
where constrained (unconstrained) is defined as the top (bottom) tercile for each respective category in each year. The
only exception is bond, which takes value 1 if a firm has no bond rating. For details, see section B. Each regression includes
the set of standard controls. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 19: Productivity: Other metrics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(lp) log(tfp) log(tfpop) log(tfplp)
real estate value -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.025***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
market-to-book ratio 0.007 0.002 -0.020** -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
log(assets) 0.139*** 0.076*** 0.135*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
return on assets 6.764*** 6.948*** 7.508*** 7.301***
(0.134) (0.139) (0.144) (0.152)
sales growth 0.139*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.163***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Kaplan-Zingales index -0.004 -0.010*** -0.005 -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 31,278 31,278 31,278 31,278
Adjusted R-squared 0.619 0.636 0.941 0.906
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: Table 19, column (1) uses labor productivity as dependent variable, column (2) our baseline TFP estimate (for
comparison), and columns (3) and (4) estimates under Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin. Coefficients are similar in sign,
size and significance. log(lp) is log of labor productivity, log(TFP ) is log of total factor productivity estimated on the
the two-digit industry level for production function y = Akαl1−α. log(TFPop) is productivity estimated via Olley-Pakes,
log(TFPlp) via Levinsohn-Petrin. For variable definitions see section B. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 20: Compustat: TFP alternatives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆lp ∆tfp ∆tfpop ∆tfplp
∆ real estate -0.101*** -0.054*** -0.053** -0.065***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 3,282 3,235 3,282 3,282
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.138 0.164 0.145
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Growth rates are log-differences. All regressions include baseline controls. All
variables are value added weighted averages on the four-digit industry level. log(lp) is log of labor productivity, log(TFP )
is log of total factor productivity estimated on the the two-digit industry level for production function y = Akαl1−α.
log(TFPop) is productivity estimated via Olley-Pakes, log(TFPlp) via Levinsohn-Petrin. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 21: Commerical real estate price index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES long-term debt investment labor log(tfp)
real estate value (commercial) 0.146*** 0.026*** 0.014*** -0.015***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 36,847 36,847 36,048 24,120
Adjusted R-squared 0.439 0.436 0.693 0.631
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes -
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. real estate value is firm real estate value, inflated by census region commercial
real estate prices. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 22: Loan supply effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
loan level loan level loan level firm level firm level
VARIABLES bank loans bank loans bank loans demand shock supply shock
real estate value 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 0.033** -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006)
Observations 144,352 144,352 137,707 4,108 4,108
Adjusted R-squared 0.835 0.835 0.831 0.599 0.980
Firm FE Yes - - Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Bank FE - Yes Yes - -
Bank*Year FE - - Yes - -
Note: For variable definitions see section B. bank loans is syndicated loan volume standardized by lagged fixed assets.
demand and supply shock are Amiti-Weinstein demand and supply components of a weighted least squares regression of
loan growth on firm and bank dummies. For computational efficiency I focus on the largest 200 banks by loan volume in
columns (4) and (5), which cover 97 % of total loan volume in the loan level sample. Time FE are fixed effects varying
on the industry-year level (columns (1)-(3)) and (to maintain a reasonable sample size) yearly level (columns (4)-(5)).
Columns (1)-(3) are on the firm-bank-year level (loan level), while columns (4)-(5) are on the firm-year level. Key: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 8: Capital-labor ratio distribution
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Note: Histogram of log capital-labor ratios, where capital is defined as ppent and labor as emp. log (distortions) refers to
the residual of a regression of ln(k/l) on industry-year dummies.
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Table 23: Distortions and financial constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(k/l) distortion distortion distortion
real estate value -0.095*** -0.142*** -0.147*** -0.083***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 47,420 52,761 52,761 47,367
R-squared 0.848 0.726 0.726 0.755
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes - Yes Yes
Controls Yes - - Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline controls defined in 2. Distortion
is residual of a regression of firms’ log capital-labor ratios on industry-year dummies. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 9: TFP densities
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Note: For variable definitions see section B.
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Table 24: Buying real estate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KZ index payout
VARIABLES buys RE buys RE buys RE buys RE buys RE
house price index -0.143*** -0.006 -0.017 -0.025 0.051
(0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033)
hpi × constrained -0.055*** -0.077***
(0.020) (0.018)
Observations 33,180 33,180 33,180 24,057 27,833
Number of firms 3,633 3,633 3,633 3,188 3,344
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls - - Yes Yes Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Logistic regressions, dependent variable buys RE is a dummy with value 1
if real estate increases compared to last year. Columns (4)-(5) use Kaplan-Zingales index and payout ratio as measures
of financial constraints. All regressions include firm and/or year fixed effects and baseline controls. Key: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 25: Quantile regression: Allocation component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cov. cov. cov. cov. cov.
VARIABLES 10 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 90 %
∆ real estate -0.875* -0.094*** -0.022 -0.038** 0.001
(0.471) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.127)
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189
Number of groups 293 293 293 293 293
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Quantile regressions for different percentiles, including industry and year fixed
effects, as well as controls for industry capital-labor ratios, and sales growth. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 26: Buying real estate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES buildings land leases buildings land leases
firm age 0.039*** 0.014*** -0.031*** 0.080*** 0.063*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
firm age2 -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.478*** -1.420*** 0.406*** -2.936*** -3.013*** -1.117***
(0.068) (0.073) (0.073) (0.144) (0.153) (0.215)
Observations 48,462 48,462 48,462 48,317 48,191 47,713
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: Table 26 confirms the results with probit regressions. Columns (1)-(3) use firm age and firm age squared as
explanatory variables. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the exercise, while controlling for firm size, return on assets, as well as
industry dummies. In all regressions, older firms are more likely to hold buildings and land, and less likely to own
capitalized leases. The negative coefficient close to zero on squared age for buildings and land implies that the effect
decreases as firms mature. For variable definitions see section B. This table shows probit regressions with the probability
of buying certain assets as dependent variable. firm age is firms’ age as of 2017. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 10: Specialization
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Table 27: Summary statistics by specialization
not specialized specialized mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
loans/assets 1.71 (2.27) 1.41 (2.17) 8.25
real estate value 0.75 (1.23) 0.77 (1.32) -0.97
log(assets) 5.55 (1.70) 6.01 (2.13) -15.16
market-to-book ratio 1.71 (1.28) 1.85 (1.66) -5.81
return on assets 0.07 (0.15) 0.04 (0.21) 11.22
investment rate 0.30 (0.31) 0.28 (0.31) 3.70
log(TFP) -0.05 (0.73) -0.05 (0.75) 0.48
Observations 8862 6867 15729
Note: For variable definitions see section B. not specalized and specalized denote bottom and top tercile of bank special-
ization. mean diff is t-value for difference in means.
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Figure 11: Banks expanded geographically
(a) Banks vs. branches
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(b) Bank deposit diversification
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(d) ∆ unsecured loans vs ∆ diversification
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Note: FDIC data provided by Summary of Deposits and Statistics of Depository Institutions. Diversification is computed
as one minus Herfindahl index of bank deposit diversification across US counties. Secured (unsecured) lending denotes the
share of commercial loans (not) secured by real estate out of total loans.
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Table 28: Sic codes
SIC code β in % SIC description
3825 -13.4 instruments to measure electricity
2090 -8.1 miscellaneous food preparations & kindred products
5070 -7.9 wholesale-hardware & plumbing & heating equipment & supplies
3578 -7.4 calculating and accounting equipment
8700 -6.2 services-engineering, accounting, research, management
3567 -5.9 industrial furnaces and ovens
3873 -5.8 watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts
3470 -5.3 coating, engraving & allied services
5047 -4.9 medical and hospital equipment
2015 -4.8 poultry slaughtering and processing
3443 -4.8 fabricated plate work (boiler shop)
2000 -4.6 food and kindred products
8742 -4.1 management consulting services
2890 -3.8 miscellaneous chemical products
5065 -3.5 electronic parts and equipment, nec
8711 -3.3 engineering services
5122 -3.2 drugs, proprietaries, and sundries
5090 -3.1 wholesale-misc durable goods
3559 -2.9 special industry machinery, nec
3231 -2.8 products of purchased glass
3821 1.3 laboratory apparatus and furniture
3714 1.6 motor vehicle parts and accessories
3790 1.6 miscellaneous transportation equipment
5110 1.6 wholesale-paper & paper products
3577 2.1 computer peripheral equipment, nec
3851 3 ophthalmic goods
2741 3.1 miscellaneous publishing
2731 3.1 book publishing
5160 3.2 wholesale-chemicals & allied products
7990 3.5 services-miscellaneous amusement & recreation
5072 4.4 hardware
3842 4.9 surgical appliances and supplies
3530 5.7 construction, mining & materials handling machinery & equipment
3829 6 measuring and controlling devices, nec
2835 6 diagnostic substances
8060 6.2 services-hospitals
8051 6.2 skilled nursing care facilities
3663 7 radio and t.v. communications equipment
7900 10.1 services-amusement & recreation services
3575 21.4 computer terminals
Note: Top and bottom 20 industries with strongest effect on coefficient β in equation (4). β in % is relative change in β
compared to coefficient on ∆ real estate in Table 7, column (4). High (low) values indicate that excluding the industry
weakens (strengthens) the effect.
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Table 29: Firm entry after 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES long-term debt investment labor value added log(TFP) log(LP) ∆tfp
real estate value 0.335*** 0.176*** 0.028*** 0.382*** -0.062*** -0.057***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.001) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ real estate -0.072***
(0.017)
Observations 58,446 58,077 57,079 39,622 40,563 40,576 2,571
Adjusted R-squared 0.456 0.355 0.634 0.729 0.558 0.600 0.224
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Industry FE - - - - - - Yes
2digit*Year FE - - - - - - Yes
Note: For variable definitions see section B. Columns (1)-(6) show firm level results for regression equation (2) for sample
with firm entry after 1993; Column (7) industry results for equation (4). Firm level regressions cluster standard errors at
the state-year level, industry regressions use robust standard errors. All regressions include baseline controls. Key: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample details: The original sample contains 5,477 firms and 48,430 firm-year observations. Including firms that enter the
sample after 1993 adds 2,158 firms and 9,994 firm-year observations. Firms entering are on average smaller, have a lower
share of real estate, but higher investment rates and long-term debt. They also have higher levels of TFP.
Results are similar to baseline results. This reassures me that cohort effects and the changing composition of publicly
held firms (driven by the IT sector during the 1990’s) do not significantly alter results (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and
Miranda, 2007; Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2016).
Table 30: Effect of allocation on productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t t+1 t+2 low disp. high disp.
VARIABLES log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP) log(TFP)
covariance 0.050*** 0.027*** 0.007 0.052*** 0.089*** 0.033**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014)
Observations 3,538 3,258 2,977 3,526 1,021 1,018
Adjusted R-squared 0.778 0.759 0.756 0.811 0.805 0.812
Industry Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes - - -
2-digit*Year FE - - - Yes Yes Yes
Controls - - - Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table shows that the allocation component has an effect on TFP. As increases in real estate value negatively
affect allocation, they also affect TFP. For variable definitions see section B. Dependent variable in all columns is log(TFP),
independent variable the intra-industry covariance between firm size and firm productivity. Columns (1)-(3) use industry
and year fixed effects and lag the independent variable by one and two periods. There is a strong positive effect of resource
allocation on productivity. A one standard deviation increase in allocative efficiency increases contemporaneous TFP by
5 %. The effect disappears after two years. Column (4) shows that the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls and
time-varying fixed effects on the 2-digit industry level. In columns (5) and (6) disp stands for dispersion in initial real estate
value, split into top and bottom tercile. The positive effect of allocation on TFP is only a third as strong for industries
with high misallocation (those with high dispersion) in column (6). Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions
include robust standard errors.
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Bank-firm relationships To further examine whether superior screening and moni-
toring helped in mitigating the credit boom fueled by rising real estate prices, I define the
following metrics. First, for each firm I compute the yearly number of bank connections,
i.e. how many distinct banks lend to each firm in each year. Under the assumption that
firms that borrow from more banks are less opaque and better monitored, a higher num-
ber of firm-bank connection should make collateral less important. This is, firms with
more bank connections should have a lower sensitivity of debt with respect to increases
in collateral value. I define
connectionsf = average number of distinct lenders of firm f
and dummy connectedf that equals 1 if firms’ number of bank connections (as measured
by connectionsf ) is in the top tercile, and 0 if it is in the bottom tercile. Figure 12,
panel 12a shows the distribution of firm lenders. The average (median) firm has 2.3 (2)
lenders per year, with a standard deviation of 1.5 and a maximum of 17. Table 31 shows
summary statistics. Note that splitting the sample by bank connections yields strikingly
different groups compared to splitting the sample by banks’ industry specialization.
Table 32 shows results. In line with the hypothesis, firms with more bank connections
have a lower sensitivity of debt. This holds for a sample split (Columns (1) and (2)),
as well as with interaction terms (Column (3)) and within each bank-firm connection
in Column (4). Comparing columns (1) and (2), firms with few connections have a
sensitivity that is five times larger than firms with multiple lenders.38
Finally, I make use of the robust finding in the literature that the duration of bank-
firm relationships is important (Ongena and Smith, 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002). Over
time, banks learn about firms’ quality and adjust loan terms accordingly. Having a longer
relationship with a bank should make a firm less responsive to changes in collateral. In
other words, the earlier a firm and bank formed a relationship, the weaker firm debt
should respond to increases in collateral values. To this end, I define:
relationf,b = length of firm-bank relation in years. (14)
For the analysis, I focus on bank-firm connections with no breaks, i.e. continuous lending
relationships between banks and firms. Figure 12, panel 12b shows the distribution
of firm-bank relationships in years. The average (median) firm-bank relationship lasts
7.9 (7) years, with a standard deviation of 4.6 years and a maximum of 22 years. In
line with above results, Table 32, columns (5) and (6), show that longer relationships
mute the sensitivity of debt to increases in real estate value (negative coefficient on
RE × relation). This is true across and within individual firm*bank connections. Taken
together, findings in this section suggest that well-informed banks mitigated the credit
boom fueled by rising real estate prices. Related to Loutskina and Strahan (2011), the
rapid geographical expansion of several banks during the boom period might have led to
lax lending standards and thereby fueled the unsustainable lending boom.
38Note that his might be due to other reasons than bank connections per se. As shown in Table 31,
firms with multiple bank connections are significantly larger and might have to rely less on credit by sheer
size alone. However, reassuringly all three of my classifications yield similar results despite little overlap
in sample groups. Additionally, using firm*bank fixed effects uses the variation within each firm-bank
pair, which mitigates concerns that differences across firms drive findings.
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[ Figure 12 and Tables 31 and 32 about here ]
Figure 12: Connections and relations
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Table 31: Summary statistics by connections
few connections many connections mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
loans/assets 2.14 (2.57) 0.91 (1.63) 31.62
real estate value 0.64 (1.20) 0.85 (1.25) -10.01
log(assets) 4.61 (1.58) 7.69 (1.57) -112.80
market-to-book ratio 1.94 (1.85) 1.73 (1.02) 7.59
return on assets 0.01 (0.24) 0.10 (0.09) -24.82
investment rate 0.35 (0.38) 0.24 (0.21) 20.14
log(TFP) -0.13 (0.83) 0.09 (0.59) -16.60
Observations 7639 5924 13563
Note: For variable definitions see section B. few connections and many connections denote bottom and top tercile of bank
connections. mean diff is t-value for difference in means.
62
Table 32: Firm connections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
few connections many connections full sample full sample full sample full sample
VARIABLES loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets loans/assets
real estate value 0.528*** 0.092*** 0.418*** 0.407*** 0.326*** 0.564***
(0.096) (0.032) (0.058) (0.077) (0.042) (0.073)
RE × connected -0.317*** -0.230***
(0.066) (0.082)
relation 0.089***
(0.006)
RE × relation -0.006* -0.019***
(0.004) (0.007)
Observations 4,379 11,571 17,293 16,132 20,795 18,940
Adjusted R-squared 0.655 0.505 0.644 0.733 0.611 0.717
Bank*Firm FE - - - Yes - Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes -
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Note: For variable definitions see section B. loans/assets is syndicated loan volume standardized by firm fixed assets.
connected is a dummy based on firms’ average number of lenders. few connections and many connections denote bottom and
top tercile of bank connections. relation denotes the length of a bank-firm lending relation in years. Values in parentheses
denote cluster-robust standard errors. Industry∗Year FE are time-varying fixed effects on the four-digit industry level.
Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Geographic proximity of lenders Literature establishes that geographic proximity
between borrower and lender facilitates acquiring soft information and leads to better
access to capital (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Mandell
and Wilhelmsson, 2015). The information banks acquire about their borrowers contains
knowledge about value and quality of collateral, but also on profitability and efficiency.
Corte´s (2015) shows that “mortgage lenders with a physical branch near the property
being financed have better information about home-price fundamentals than non-local
lenders”. My previous results documented that inefficient firms increased their borrow-
ing when collateral values rise. If banks have better information about the underlying
efficiency of firms, they should be more hesitant to lend to low quality borrowers (note
that high real estate firms have lower ROA, productivity, and sales growth - even if pro-
ductivity is not observable, ROA and sales growth are). In this section I will show that,
for a given increase in real estate value, firms’ borrowing increases by less if lenders and
borrowers are geographically closer.
Building on a strand of literature that highlight the importance of geographic prox-
imity in gathering hard and soft information, I define proximity in the following way.
County data files provide information on the number of branches and offices, as well as
bank deposits, in each county. I compute for each county the number of bank branches
per capita (proximity), as well as average deposits per branch (concentration) and split
counties into bottom and top tercile. Counties in the bottom tercile of proximity have
fewer banks per capita, which I interpret as a larger distance between borrower and lender
(I will call areas in the bottom tercile remote and the top tercile close). Similarly, coun-
ties in the top tercile of concentration are dominated by a few very large lenders with
inferior information about borrowers.39 The fact that real estate is mainly owned by
inefficient firms yields the following hypothesis: Firms in counties with closer proximity
between lenders and borrowers should see a lower sensitivity of borrowing in response to
an increase in collateral value. The argument is that, if banks’ know about a firm’s un-
derlying productivity, they are less willing to lend to unproductive firms against a given
increase in collateral value.
To further investigate the role of information, I split my measure of real estate value
into two components: buildings and land (separately inflated by state-level price indices).
In general, land has lower loan-to-value (LTV) ratios than structures, as its market value
is harder to verify (OCC, 2017). Additionally, the negative correlation between land
value and log productivity is almost twice as large compared to total real estate value
and productivity. This is, land is more information sensitive and land owning firms are
inefficient, so the informational advantage of proximity should be greater for land than
buildings.
Table 33 shows that the sensitivity of firms’ long-term debt to higher real estate value
is weaker in areas with close proximity between lenders and borrowers. All independent
variables are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns (1)-(2)
use real estate value as explanatory variable. For a one standard deviation increase
39More banks could also imply higher competition, which theoretically could lead to more risk taking,
but also prudence. Degryse and Ongena (2007) show that tougher competition leads to a stronger
reliance on relationship lending, which, in this context, supports the idea that more banks per capita
imply better information.
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in real estate value, firms’ long term debt increases by 35.2 cents in counties with low
proximity in coulmn (1), and by 29.5 cents in counties with high proximity in column
(2). The sensitivity is 0.352/0.295 = 1.19 times stronger in areas where lenders have poor
information about borrowers (column (1)). Once I split real estate value into structures
(columns (3)-(4)) and land ((5)-(6)), the general pattern remains. Increases in land
value have a weaker effect on long-term debt, which likely reflects lower LTV ratios.
Confirming the hypothesis, the ratio across county groups is 1.17 for buildings and 1.37
for land. The more information sensitive the underlying appreciating asset, the starker the
difference in borrowing sensitivities across counties ranked by proximity. (In unreported
robustness checks I show that results are similar for the concentration metric. Also, firms
in areas with a higher share of savings banks see a stronger sensitivity of long-term debt
to collateral value. This is likely due to the business model of savings banks, which rely
mostly on residential and commercial mortgage lending. All results are robust to the
addition of industry∗year and state∗year fixed effects.)
Table 33: Banking concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
remote close remote close remote close
VARIABLES long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt long-term debt
real estate value 0.352*** 0.295***
(0.050) (0.050)
real estate value (structures) 0.394*** 0.336***
(0.047) (0.048)
real estate value (land) 0.251*** 0.185***
(0.049) (0.049)
Observations 10,438 10,461 10,415 10,358 10,438 10,452
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.502 0.496 0.503 0.489 0.499
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year State*Year
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table shows that geographical proximity leads to a muted response of firms’ long-term debt to rising real estate
values. remote and close denote top and bottom terciles of counties with respect to number of banks per capita. For
variable definitions see section B. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include cluster-robust standard
errors and baseline controls.
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C.2 Spillover effects
Table 34: Crowding out effects: local wages and employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆ emp. exp. ∆ emp ∆ wage ∆ emp. exp. ∆ emp ∆ wage
∆ house price index 0.207*** 0.153*** 0.056*** 0.110*** 0.071*** 0.039***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
Observations 360,179 360,124 360,523 360,007 359,961 360,271
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.039 0.036 0.018
State*Time FE - - - Yes Yes Yes
Controls - - - Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State State State State State State
Table 35: Crowding out effects: local wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
no FIRE
VARIABLES ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ wage
∆ house price index 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.033*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 360,523 360,051 359,801 359,801 254,957
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.010 0.017
County*Naics FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE - - Yes - -
State*Time FE - - - Yes Yes
Controls - - Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State State State State State
Note: These tables show results for county-industry-year regressions. I use data provided by Quarterly Workforce Indicators
to calculate county-industry level employment and wages. Results in Table 34 show that rising house prices lead to an
increase in total employment expenditure that is driven by an increase in employment (3/4) and an increase in wages (1/4).
Zooming in on wages, under the most stringent specification in Table 35, column (4), a 100 % increase in house prices
increases local industry wages by 4.4 %. This suggests significant negative spillover effects. An increase in local house
prices relaxes collateral constraints. Firms that own collateral expand and hire workers, which drives up wages. For firms
that do not own collateral, the increase in labor costs likely negatively affects output. For variable definitions see section
B. Key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include cluster-robust standard errors.
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